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I. INTRODUCrION
The industrial revolution of the twentieth century is in fact a chemical revolution
with an estimated fifty-five thousand chemicals' utilized in the workplace. While not
all of these pose a threat to workers' health, society's knowledge of those that are
harmful is increasing rapidly. 2 Concern over the health hazards associated with
chemical exposure in the work environment has been brought into sharp focus by the
recent barrage of cases concerning worker exposure to asbestos, 3 the harbinger of the
deadly cancer mesothelioma.
Concurrent with the chemical revolution have been important advances made
in the field of genetic engineering which now enable scientists to better identify
which genetic and environmental factors in combination produce which illnesses. 4
A natural application of such scientific advances would appear to be in the work-
place where employees in a number of industries are being exposed to an increasing
array of chemicals on a daily basis. 5 A simple blood test would enable scientists to
identify which workers are at greater risk from exposure to certain toxins and alert
such workers to the potential harm.6 The giving of genetic tests7 is far easier, how-
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1. Genetic Screening in the Workplace: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (Oct. 1982).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 731 F.2d 775 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. 111. 1981);
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984). There are an estimated three hundred cases filed against
Johns-Manville Corporation alone over hazardous exposure to asbestos.
4. See generally Z. Ha'sANi & R. HurroN, GENzrc PRoptacy: BEYOND THE DOUBLE HEUX (1981); Reinhardt,
Chemical Hypersusceptibility, 20 J. Occup. MED. 319 (May 1978); Stokinger & Scheel, Hypersusceptibility and Genetic
Problems in Occupational Medicine-A Consensus Report, 153 Occur. MED. 564 (1973).
5. OFFIcE oF TEcHuozooe AssEss.tEmr, 98TH CoNo., ISr SEss., THE ROLE OF GENmc TsrrN jN mTE PRsvrtnoN oF
Occut ~o NAL DnsEAsE 24 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as REPOr]. The Office of Technology Assessment
undertook this study at the request of the House Committee on Science and Technology. The Report analyzes the extent
of genetic testing, its technology, and its social, legal, ethical, and economic implications. A study conducted by the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health estimates that 361 million workers were exposed to chemicals in the
workplace and that 8.9 million workers were exposed to chemicals which we now know are harmful. Id. at 24. The number
one health priority according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is exposure to chemicals. Id.
6. Id. at 57.
7. "Genetic testing of employee populations is a basic method for identifying individuals or groups with particular
inherited traits or evidence of genetic damage in certain cells who may be at increased risk for disease. It is the application
of tests to a group of apparently well persons in order to identify those who have a high probability of developing a disease
so that prevention or early treatment is possible." Id.
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ever, than the decision of what actions to take as a result of the tests. The practice
of genetic testing in the workplace raises serious ethical and legal concerns
which have recently been addressed by journalists,8 Congress, 9 scientists,' 0 ethi-
cists," and lawyers.' 2
The practice of testing workers to determine hypersusceptibility 13 to toxins' 4 in
the workplace first received national attention in a series of articles in the New York
Times in 1980.15 Since then, a survey of the use of genetic testing in the workplace
has been conducted by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).16
After this survey, hearings were held by the House Science and Technology Com-
mittee. 17 In April of 1983 OTA published its report.18 The results of the survey
indicated that although genetic testing is currently being used by only six companies,
fifty-five companies stated that they were considering using it in the future. 19
The use of genetic testing in the workplace has raised concern among various
groups. Some researchers question the probative value20 of such tests, 21 while union
8. See. e.g., Severo, Dispute Arises over Dow Studies on Genetic Damage in Workers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1980,
at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Severo I]; Severo, Screening of Blacks by Du Pont Sharpens Debate on Gene Tests,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at At, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Severo 11]; Severo, Genetic Tests by Industry Raise Questions
on Rights of Workers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Severo IlM]; Hilts, More Employers
Testing Workers' Genes, Wash. Post, May 6, 1983, at A5, col. 1.
9. The United States Congressional Office of Technology Assessment conducted a study in 1982 of workplace
genetic screening which surveyed the five hundred largest United States industrial companies, the fifty largest private
utilities, and eleven unions. Although only six of the 366 respondents said they were using genetic screening, fifty-five
stated they anticipated using such testing in the next five years. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 31.
10. See, e.g., Omenn, Predictive Identification of Hypersusceptible Individuals, 24 J. Occuv. MID. 369 (May
1982); Reinhardt, supra note 4; Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4; Wright, Panel Discussion: Role of the Knowledge of
High Risk Groups in Occupational Health Policies and Practices, 29 Envtl. Health Persp. 143 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Murray, Warning: Screening Workers for Genetic Risk, 13 H ssos CiaER REP. 5 (Feb. 1983);
Sheridan, Genetic Screening: Its Promise and Peril, 53 J. Occus. HAzARDs 75 (Apr. 1983); Sheridan, Reproductive
Hazards: Probing the Ethical Issues, 54 J. Occuvp. HAZARDS 72 (May 1983).
12. See, e.g., Diamond, Genetic Testing in Employment Situations-A Question of WorkerRights, 4 J. LEGA. MED.
231 (1983); Goodrich, Are Your Genes Right for Your Job?, 3 CAL. LAw. 24 (May 1983); McGarity & Schroeder,
Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REv. 999 (1981); Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility
to Occupational Illness, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1379 (1983); Sanchez, Genetic Testing: The Genesis of A New Era In Employee
Protection, 11 W. ST. U.L. REv. 199 (1984); Note, Genetic Testing in Employment: Employee Protection or Threat?, 15
Suwout U.L. REv. 1187 (1981).
13. "Hypersusceptible" describes those persons who are more sensitive to toxic exposure than the average person.
N. AsHoO, CIsIs iN THE WoR"LAtCe 11l8 (1976).
14. "Toxins" describes poisonous, carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic substances. Id. at 78.
15. See supra note 8.
16. See supra note 9.
17. See Genetic Screening in the Workplace: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings (Oct. 1982)];
Genetic Screening of Workers: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearings (June 1982)]; Genetic
Screening and the Handling of High-Risk Groups in the Workplace: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings (Oct. 1981)].
18. See REPoRT, supra note 5.
19. Id. at 9, 34.
20. A number of genetic tests are currently being used by industry: sickle cell, G-6-PD, SAT, methomoglobin
reductus, and red blood cell/serum disorder. In advocating the enactment of legislation to regulate the use of genetic
testing, this Article focuses on those tests which are known to have probative value. See infra text accompanying notes
65-71 for a discussion of such tests. In order for a test to have a probative value, it must be both reliable and valid.
Reliability of a test addresses the issue of repeated application with consistent results, while validity addresses the issue
of accuracy in measuring what the test is intended to measure. Diamond, supra note 12, at 235. The issue of probative
value of a test in identifying which tests may be used in the employment sector cannot be overemphasized, particularly
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leaders have expressed concern regarding the potential for improper use of genetic test
results. 22 In particular, union officials have voiced the opinion that the process is
subject to gross abuse and raises fundamental legal questions concerning the em-
ployer's right to use and disseminate the results of such tests.23 For example, may an
employer refuse to hire someone because he has a greater potential of contracting a
job-related disease than another? Critics of genetic testing have two central concerns:
first, that genetic testing provides employers with an excuse for not making greater
efforts to clean up the workplace environment; 24 and second, that "the same
information that may help an employee decide to avoid a toxic substance may also be
used by an employer to force a worker out of a job.' '2 5 On the other hand, advocates
of genetic testing believe that it has the potential to play an important role in the
prevention of occupational disease. 26 The basis of this belief is that, although the
workplace cannot be made risk-free,
[b]y identifying workers who may be at increased risk of disease because of past or
potential exposure to hazardous substances, preventive measures could be taken by the
company or by the workers themselves. In addition to the direct benefits associated with
improved health, there could be indirect benefits such as reduction in the costs to
employers, employees, and society associated with occupational illness.27
Several articles have been written which address one or more of the legal issues
surrounding genetic testing and which recommend guidelines for its application. 28
Although there have been no cases reported in which an employee alleged discrim-
ination in employment on the basis of his genetic make-up, 29 the spectre raised by
genetic testing is awesome: "[i]f we learn to predict which individuals are more likely
if the tests result in the refusal to hire or removal of a hypersusceptible person from a toxic environment. For a more
detailed discussion of the validity and reliability of such tests, see Diamond, supra note 12, at 234-40; Rothstein, supra
note 12, at 1416-24; Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4, at 568-73.
21. See, e.g., Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 49-62 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth B. Miller, Medical
Director, Workers' Institute for Safety and Health) [hereinafter referred to as Dr. Kenneth B. Miller].
22. See, e.g., id. at 107-11 (testimony of James English, Associate General Counsel, United Steelworkers of
America) [hereinafter referred to as James English, Esq.].
23. Id.
24. Holden, Looking at Genes in the Workplace, 217 Sct. 336 (July 23, 1982).
25. Z. HlAmSAns & R. HrrToN, supra note 4, at 118. See also Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 107.
26. See Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 3-6 (testimony of Dr. Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Researcher, Biological
Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States) [hereinafter referred to as
Gretchen S. Kolsrud].
27. Id. at 3.
28. See supra note 12.
29. There have been, however, several cases brought by women under Title VII alleging sex discrimination on the
theory that they were denied access to certain higher paying jobs because the jobs involved exposure to substances
potentially harmful to a fetus. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (female employees brought
suit under Title VII alleging that the company's fetal vulnerability program discriminated against them); Zuniga v. Kleberg
County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (hospital X-ray technician filed a Title VII action alleging that she was
discriminated against when discharged after becoming pregnant). A number of articles which address the legal rights of
women who are discriminated against in the workplace because of employer concern over fetal injury have been written.
See, e.g., Vanderwaerdt, Resolving the Conflict Between Hazardous Substances in the Workplace and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 21 Amt. Bus. L.J. 157 (1983); Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CA1uF. L. REv.
1113 (1977); Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices in HazardousIndustries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 COLUM.
J. Esvn.. L. 97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices]; Note, Birth Defects Caused by
Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Lav, 12 J. LAw REF. 237 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Birth Defects and the Workplace].
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to be harmed by exposure to certain substances, it has potential to serve as a
marvelous tool to protect the health of workers, or as a terrible vehicle for invidious
discrimination. "30 The purpose of this Article is to identify the fundamental concerns
posed by the practice of genetic testing to both the employer and the employee and
to propose a legislative solution to accommodate these concerns.
This Article will begin with a review of the state of the art of genetic testing and
the results of the OTA study. Next, the Article will address employee and employer
concerns with the practice of genetic testing and the inadequacies of current legisla-
tion and the common law to deal with these concerns. To put the problem in
perspective, consider the following fact situation. John Doe is a healthy young black
man who applies for a job at a chemical plant. He is given a routine physical
examination by the company doctor in connection with his preemployment applica-
tion. Included in the examination is a blood test. The use of this test is not explained
to John Doe, nor does he inquire about it. Several weeks later he receives a letter in
the mail thanking him for his interest and stating that another candidate more suitable
for the job was found. Unbeknown to John Doe, he is a carrier of a sickle cell trait.
The chemical company has reliable information obtained from reliable genetic tests
performed on his blood indicating that John Doe would be ten times more likely to
develop sickle cell anemia because of his genetic make-up. There were other
applicants qualified for the job, and the company decided not to hire John Doe
because of the risk of his contracting an occupational illness. The decision was not
merely altruistic, but was based on economics and the uncertainty concerning the
employer's duties to such an employee.
The above fact situation raises a number of concerns faced by both the applicant
and the employer. If the applicant were given the basis for his rejection he surely
would raise questions concerning the employer's right to discriminate in this fashion.
He also might be concerned with the disclosure of such information to other
companies in the industry because such disclosure might foreclose job opportunities
in his given field of expertise. Furthermore, John Doe might have wanted this genetic
trait disclosed to him so that he could make informed lifestyle decisions including
whether to continue working in the chemical industry. Alternatively, he might have
been willing to accept the risk of contracting sickle cell anemia because he is a risk
taker.
In turn, the employer is concerned over issues of liability in connection with such
tests. Currently, the law establishes no incentive for employers to test or to reveal the
nature of the test or the results. Does the employer have a duty to disclose results of
the test? Does he have the right to foreclose job opportunities to applicants on the
chance that the employee might contract an occupational disease?
The concerns of an employee include discriminatory application of genetic
testing under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law, and privacy concerns
under constitutional and common law. Following discussion of these employee
30. Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 2 (testimony of Representative Gore, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight [hereinafter referred to as Chairman Gore].
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considerations, the two major concerns of the employer will be addressed. These
concerns are the duty to test under common law and the effects of genetic testing on
employer compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). This
Article will set forth what legislation in this area should accomplish and will conclude
by suggesting a legislative proposal which addresses the concerns surrounding the
practice of genetic testing.
I. GENETIc TEsTI NG-A BACKGROUND
One survey indicates that occupational illness cost the United States economy
more than 850,000 workdays in 1981.3 1 It has been estimated that exposure to
hazardous substances in the workplace plays a role in five percent of all cancers. 32
Without question, occupational illness has a significant effect on the economy, not to
mention the devastating impact it has upon the affected worker and his family. A
problem of such scope and importance demands serious consideration of all reason-
able approaches to reducing the incidence of occupational illness. One such approach
is suggested by the following example: Although hundreds of thousands of workers
are exposed to cotton dust in textile factories, only a small percentage of these actually
contract the lung disease byssinosis. Is it possible to identify those workers most likely
to contract this illness and protect them by not hiring them for such work? As early
as 1938 there was conjecture that knowledge of hereditary traits was possibly a key
to protecting hypersusceptible workers from certain illnesses:
The majority of potters do not die of bronchitis. It is quite possible that if we really
understood the causation of this disease we should find out that only a fraction of potters
are of a constitution which renders them liable to it. If so, we could eliminate potters'
bronchitis by regulating entrants into the potters' industry who are congenitally exposed
to it. 33
It was not until the 1950's that scientists were able to identify a link be-
tween genetic make-up and violent reactions to certain drugs, but by 1960 toxi-
cologists had drawn the analogy between drug ingestion and chemical ex-
posures in general. 34 The importance of this analogy and its implications for
susceptibility evaluation by employers was heralded by two toxicologists, Stokinger
and Mountain, in 1963. 35 Ten years later Stokinger and another toxicologist, Scheel,
published an article that identified five candidates for hypersusceptibility, one of
which was the sickle cell trait. 36 Notwithstanding these developments, testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Science and Technology 37 and recent publica-
31. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 5, 23.
32. Id. at 23.
33. Murray, supra note 11, at 5.
34. Id.
35. They suggested that a susceptibility evaluation during the job placement examination would preclude exposing
a worker to toxins to which he is hypersusceptible. "This is preventive toxicology in the highest form; no previous single
development in toxicology has opened such prospects for the medical supervision of workers." Stokinger & Mountain,
Tests for Hypersusceptibilty to Hemolytic Chemicals, 6 ARscvEs oF EmnV. HEALTH 57, 496 (April 1963).
36. Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4.
37. See, e.g., Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 49 (statement of Dr. Kenneth B. Miller).
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tions38 caution that genetic testing for the purpose of screening out the hyper-
susceptible worker should not routinely be utilized at this time because the validity
and reliability of such tests are in doubt.
In October 1981 a House subcommittee chaired by Representative Gore began
an inquiry into the issues raised by genetic testing in occupational settings.39 At the
time of these initial hearings the consensus was that the art of genetic testing was in
its embryonic stages and that validated and reasonably predictive testing was still
years away. 40 However, because there was a suspicion that genetic testing was
currently being used by industry for a variety of purposes, the subcommittee felt it
appropriate to conduct a study to determine the extent of such practices. 4' There were
several purposes of the survey: to determine the frequency of past, present, and future
genetic testing; to identify which tests were used and under what circumstances; and
to determine how the results of the test were used.42 Questionnaires were mailed to
the five hundred largest industrial companies, the fifty largest private utilities, and the
eleven major unions representing the largest number of employees in these compa-
nies. 43 Three hundred sixty-six organizations answered the questionnaires represent-
ing a sixty-five percent response rate.44 Six (1.6 percent) of the respondents stated
they were currently using genetic testing; seventeen (4.6 percent) of the respondents
stated they had used genetic testing in the last twelve years; and fifty-nine (16.1
percent) of the respondents answered that they might use genetic testing in the
future. 45 Among the group who are currently testing, two are in the chemical industry,
two are utilities, and two are in the electronics industry.46 Half of those who tested
in the past are chemical companies. 47 The companies were asked about the circum-
stances under which the tests were administered (routinely, for research, or for other
purposes). The responding companies which engaged in such testing said that it was
done routinely. 48 Testing for sickle cell traits was generally based on ethnic back-
ground, while selection of employees for other types of tests was made according to
their jobs.49 No respondent reported basing a genetic test on an employee's sex. 50
38. See, e.g., REPoRT, supra note 5, at 57-61 (genetic tests at this date are not very reliable); Omenn, supra note
10, at 373 (validity of such practices questioned); Ressnick, Letters to the Editor, 15 J. Occup. MED. 858, 860 (November
1973) (only limited evidence available to prove validity of genetic testing); Severo II, supra note 8, at A13, cols. 4-5
(several physicians have concluded that genetic testing is not valuable except as a research tool). But see Reinhardt, supra
note 4, at 320 (genetic testing is useful to identify those hypersusceptible to certain substances); Stokinger & Scheel, supra
note 4, at 564 (genetic testing is useful in identifying hypersusceptibility for the worker's own personal benefit).
39. See supra note 17.
40. See generally Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17; Sheridan, Genetic Screening: Its Promise and Peril, supra
note 11.
41. See generally Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17; Sheridan, Genetic Screening: Its Promise and Peril, supra
note 11.
42. Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 8-9 (testimony of Gretchen S. Kolsrud).
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Responses concerning the use of genetic testing results varied greatly, ranging
from actions involving employees to actions taken to change or discontinue certain
products.sl Of the eighteen companies which reported taking action, eight reported that
they informed the employee of a potential problem, five reported transferring the hy-
persusceptible employee, and two suggested the employee seek another job.52 No em-
ployer reported dismissing an employee because of his or her hypersusceptibility. 53
Because of the evidence of current use and future interest in genetic testing, 54
OTA conducted further research to assess the technology and its implications. Their
conclusions and recommendations were published in the April 1983 report, "The
Role of Genetic Testing in the Prevention of Occupational Disease." 55 The Report
concluded that "[n]one of the genetic tests evaluated by OTA meets established
scientific criteria for routine use in an occupational setting. However, there is enough
suggestive evidence to merit further research." 56 Moreover, the evidence that genetic
testing currently occurs raises serious legal questions relating to responsibility for
workplace safety and employee rights.
Genetic testing has two different applications in the workplace setting: cytoge-
netic testing (genetic monitoring)57 and biochemical testing (genetic screening).58 The
former involves periodic examinations of workers to determine whether a worker's
genetic make-up is changing during the course of his employment and to monitor
exposure to toxic chemicals or radiation.5 9 Use of this form of testing would be done
to identify those workers who are at an increased risk of developing diseases such as
cancer. It can serve as an early warning system by indicating that the degree of
exposure to specific health hazards is too high or that an unsuspected hazard poses a
health threat. 6o Genetic screening, on the other hand, involves a one-time test to
determine whether a worker carries a particular trait that might render him more
susceptible to hazardous chemicals or radiation. The goal of genetic screening is to
identify hypersusceptible workers in order to exclude them from a potentially harmful
work environment as a preventive medical practice.61
Although the issue of genetic testing involves complex social, legal, and political
issues, the test itself is extremely simple to perform. Only a small quantity of blood
from the employee is needed. 62 According to testimony before the House Subcom-
mittee on Investigation and Oversight, preemployment physical examinations often
requiring a blood sample are administered to approximately half of the nation's
51. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 37.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 38.
54. See RaEoar, supra note 5, at 33-39.
55. REioar, supra note 5.
56. Id. at 9-10.
57. For a thorough explanation of the precepts involved in cytogenetic monitoring, see REPoRT, supra note 5, at
67-88.
58. For a detailed analysis of biochemical testing, see id. at 89-101.
59. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 67.
60. Id. at 23.
61. Note, supra note 12, at 1191.
62. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 57.
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employees. 63 Testimony before the Subcommittee also indicated that little or no
regulation exists which defines what medical tests may be performed or what
personnel action may be taken as a result of such tests. 64
Scientists have devised a number of genetic tests to be used by industrial
employers to identify genetic abnormalities of employees. Although scientists in
occupational medicine have disagreed generally over the validity of genetic testing as
proof of hypersusceptibility to occupational disease, 65 several tests are conceded to
have validity. One such test is used to identify the sickle cell trait, an abnormal protein
which is found in persons of African, Mediterranean, or Middle-Eastem descent, as
well as in approximately eight percent of American blacks. 66 A second test which is
generally recognized as valid identifies a glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase
(G-6-PD) deficiency which is found in approximately eleven percent of Mediterra-
nean Jews and American blacks. 67 Evidence suggests that if persons with either of the
above deficiencies are exposed to nitro and amino compounds such as benzene or
lead, they could suffer adverse effects. 68 Yet a third reliable test is used to identify
people with a serum antitrypgin (SAT) deficiency. 69 Typically, this deficiency occurs
in people of Northern and Central European heritage 7o and renders them more
susceptible to chest ailments. 71 Since a majority of industrial chemicals and fibers in
the textile industries give rise to respiratory ailments, such employers, for example,
would conceivably want to prescreen prospective employees for SAT deficiency.
Authors have suggested numerous reasons for such testing by employers: general
research into occupational illness; requests of employees or unions; the protection of
workers; and the avoidance of legal liability for nontesting. 72 In particular, an
employer may engage in such testing to avoid claims subject to workers' compen-
sation. 73 These claims may be of two varieties: those which arise in connection with
a hypersusceptible worker's degenerative condition over the period of exposure; and
those which are latent and may not arise until many years after the period of exposure
has ceased.74 An employer may test to avoid liability under tort law for negligently
63. Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 104 (statement of Mark A. Rothstein, Professor of Law, West Virginia
University) [hereinafter referred to as Prof. Mark A. Rothstein].
64. Id. See also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1428.
65. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
66. Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 320; Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4, at 571 (five percent of American blacks have
the sickle cell trait.). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1192.
67. Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4, at 568 (identifies G-6-PD as prevalent to particular ethnic groups and as
the most widespread, clinically important genetic abnormality). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1192.
68. See Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 320 (persons with G-6-PD deficiency should not be allowed to work with nitro
and amino compounds); Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4, at 572 (those with the sickle cell trait face greater health risk
if exposed to benzene and lead). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1192.
69. Note, supra note 12, at 1192.
70. See Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 321 (two to five percent of English, Irish, Germans, and French-Belgians have
an SAT deficiency); Stokinger & Scheel, supra note 4, at 566 (Central Europeans represent majority of those with SAT
deficiency); Note, supra note 12, at 1192-93; Severo III, supra note 8, at A36, col. 2.
71. Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 321; Note, supra note 12, at 1193.
72. See Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 23 (Table VI); Diamond, supra note 12, at 233 n.12; McGarity
& Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1001.
73. Note, supra note 12, at 1194-95.
74. Id.
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exposing a worker to toxins without warning him of their known danger or for the
birth defects of a child resulting from parental exposure to toxic substances. 75
Employer applications of genetic testing raise issues regarding employee rights.
Concern has been expressed that genetic screening will be used to limit access by
hypersusceptible job applicants to a number of jobs and promotions wherever there
is a risk of toxic exposure. 76 Such an application might result in the relegation of
hypersusceptible employees to the lower paying jobs or even to unemployment
because of their genetic make-up. 77 Similarly, a hypersusceptible employee may
suffer salary cuts when his hypersusceptibility is discovered and he is transferred to
a nontoxic work area.78 Finally, it is suggested that employers might use genetic
testing, screening in particular, to obviate the requirement under OSHA to make the
workplace safe "for every man and woman.'' 79 The spectre raised by the use of
genetic testing in the workplace is thus multifaceted. 80 In furtherance of identifying
the proper scope of proposed legislation regulating genetic testing, the next section of
this Article will identify employee concerns about such practices.
III. EMPLOYEE CONCERNS OVER GENETIc TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE
As expressed in the congressional hearings, one of the primary concerns of
employee representatives is that genetic testing will be used to discriminate against
various subcategories of the workforce through exclusionary practices. 8' Although
the OTA survey results conclude that no employer who tested for genetic abnormal-
ities had based a hiring decision on the results of such a test, 82 there is clearly an
economic incentive to do so. 83 In examining our current legal framework, an
employee who suspects that he has been discriminated against on the basis of genetics
may pursue several avenues: a cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
75. Id. at 1196.
76. Id. at 1193.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). A fetal vulnerability program initiated by Olin
Corporation several years ago precluded women of childbearing age from certain jobs classified as involving possible
exposure to harmful chemicals dangerous to a fetus. Women barred from higher paying jobs by the fetal vulnerability
program subsequently brought suit against their employer under Title VII alleging discrimination. See infra notes 144-49
and accompanying text.
79. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 28.
80. While the focus of this Article will be weighted more heavily on genetic screening, genetic monitoring raises
many of the same legal questions, thus reference shall be made generally to both such practices by use of the term genetic
testing. Where relevant, the term "genetic screening" will be used to apply to biochemical testing (see supra note 58 and
accompanying text), and the term "genetic monitoring" will be used to apply to cytogenetic testing (see supra note 57
and accompanying text).
81. Such concern was expressed in a statement by James English, Associate General Counsel of the United
Steelworkers of America: "We have a genuine concern that the rapid development of knowledge in this area [genetic
testing] may lead to the misuse of the information, particularly by excluding from workplace and from jobs persons who
are otherwise qualified to perform work." Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 107 (testimony of James English,
Esq.).
82. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 37-38.
83. As aptly stated by Representative Gore, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight of the
Committee on Science and Technology, "[t]he increasing costs of making improvements in the workplace environment
and the financial burdens posed by workers' compensation and similar statutes have provided many industries with a strong
economic incentive to engage in preemployment screening." Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17, at I (testimony of
Representative Gore).
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of 1964,84 a cause of action under Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,85 or a cause of action under various state discrimination laws. 86 In furtherance
of identifying the need for and content of specific legislation addressing the use of
genetic testing by employers, this section will briefly analyze the anticipated outcome
of any such litigation under the two federal antidiscrimination statutes and under
various state statutes. This section will also analyze employee concerns involving
rights of privacy, confidentiality, and the right to be told of the presence of toxins in
the workplace.
A. Title VII
In enacting Title VII Congress' goal was to remove all "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discrim-
inate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." 87 Specifically, Title
VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 88 The intent of Title VII is to prohibit employment practices which
classify or segregate employees on the basis of one of the above mentioned catego-
ries. 89 The Act prohibits both overt discrimination (disparate treatment) and employ-
ment policies which, although fair in form, are discriminatory in effect (disparate
impact).90 In theory, Title VII promotes equal employment opportunity regardless of
genetic make-up. Genetic discrimination 9 appears to fall under the prohibition of
Title VII in three categories: race, national origin, and sex. 92
While a grievance based on genetic discrimination represents a case of first
impression, analogies may be drawn to a developing body of cases93 addressing the
84. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-el7
(1976 & Supp. 1979)) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
86. For a comprehensive list of the 41 states and the District of Columbia which have enacted laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of a handicap in employment, see Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1437 n.392.
87. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. 1979). Section 703(a) of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
89. Id. See also DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1979) (one of the purposes of
Title VII is to prohibit discrimination against blacks).
90. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
91. Congress left the definition of the term "discrimination" as used in Title VII to the discretion of the courts.
The term has been judicially interpreted as "a failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be
found between those favored and those not favored." Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D.
Cal. 1972).
92. Responses to the OTA Survey showed that employees were selected for sickle cell testing on the basis of their
race or national origin and on the basis of job category for other types of tests. No employer, however, reported basing
a test on an employee's sex. REwoRr, supra note 5, at 34-36 (Table 7). As will be discussed, genetic discrimination based
on blood tests will most often affect women because employers perceive them to be more hypersusceptible to toxins in
the workplace than their male counterparts. See infra note 99. Under these circumstances, the appropriate cause of action
would be one of disparate treatment. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1457.
93. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text (regarding Title VII application to sex discrimination based on
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issue of sex discrimination based on an employer's policy of excluding fertile women
from jobs deemed harmful to the fetus. Similar to the approaches taken in the fetal
cases, a discrimination case may be analyzed under three theories: facial discrimi-
nation, pretextual discrimination (both subsumed under the name "disparate treat-
ment"), and disparate impact. 94 Each theory will be reviewed in terms of establishing
a prima facie case and recognizing the defenses an employer may raise to counteract
a charge of discrimination based on genetic testing.
1. Facial Discrimination and the BFOQ Defense
The first theory on which a plaintiff may base a claim for discrimination based
on genetic testing is the disparate treatment model of facial discrimination. Title VII
"proscribes intentional employment practices that result in disparate treatment among
those who are similarly situated. 95 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under this model, plaintiff must prove that the discrimination was purposeful or
intentional or show proof of actions from which such discrimination can be inferred. 96
Such proof may be evidenced by the following criteria: 1) plaintiff was a member of
a protected class; 2) plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite being qualified, plaintiff was rejected;
and 4) the job remained open after his rejection. 97 A member of a protected class who
was denied employment because of hypersusceptibility can establish a prima facie
case by proving that the genetic test administered resulted in higher rejection rates for
the member's class and the use of the test was motivated by bad faith or animus
the exclusion of fertile women from certain jobs). The sex-based discrimination cases are addressed herein primarily
because they pose the most analogous issues to genetic testing provided to date by case law.
94. See generally Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Williams, Firing the Women
to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 Gen.
L.J. 641, 673-82 (1981).
95. Note, supra note 12, at 1199. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
96. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978); White v. City of San Diego, 605 F.2d 455,
458 (9th Cir. 1979). The burden of establishing a case of disparate treatment requires that the plaintiff provide direct or
circumstantial proof of discriminatory motive. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15
(1977); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1014 (1 Ith Cir. 1982). Statistics may be used as part
of the circumstantial evidence to support such an inference. The statistics must clearly show the discrepancy in treatment
of the protected class, thus their usefulness "depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). It is clear, however, that if the plaintiff presents only the
statistics without proof of discriminatory intent, the case becomes one of disparate impact.
97. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). However, the nature and purpose of Title VII
require that the McDonnell Douglas test remain flexible. "What must be shown to support an inference that the plaintiff
was discriminated against depends on the facts of each case." Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686,700 (9th
Cir. 1984); Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, "[i]n the rare situation in which the
evidence establishes that an employer openly discriminates against an individual it is not necessary to apply the mechanical
formula of McDonnell Douglas to establish an inference of intentional discrimination; the showing has already been made
directly." Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted); accord Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981) (McDonnell Douglas formula is not inflexible but may vary according
to the facts of each case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (the four elements not
necessarily applicable in all regards to different fact situations). See also Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d
959, 962 (5th Cir. 1981) (McDonnellDouglas formula is only one method to set forth a prima facie case); Gunther v. Iowa
State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (8th Cir.) (actual admission of discrimination on the basis of sex
suffices to prove a prima facie showing of discrimination), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
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against the protected class. 98 It thus appears clear that job applicants or employees
who have been discriminated against on the basis of the results of a genetic test may
maintain a cause of action pursuant to the facial discrimination model of disparate
treatment under Title VII.99 Establishment of intent to discriminate is a key element
of this cause of action. 00
Even though the employee has established a prima facie case of disparate
treatment, the employer may nonetheless justify discrimination on the basis of a bona
fide occupational qualification (bfoq). Title VII specifically provides that an employer
may base a hiring decision on sex, religion, or national origin (but never race or color)
when that characteristic is reasonably necessary to the operation of the employer's
business.' 0 However, the relevance of this defense to employers when confronted
with allegations of discrimination on the basis of genetic test results is questionable.
Despite the fact that the language of Title VII specifically bases the exception on sex,
religion, or national origin, to date section 703(e) has been narrowly construed to
apply only to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.t0 2
98. Note, supra note 12, at 1199.
99. Rothstein states that disparate treatment based on medical tests is most likely to affect women and suggests that
their real or perceived susceptibility results in certain reactions from employers: I) the imposition of unique conditions
on women only; 2) a conclusion that women have a greater susceptibility to toxins than men; and 3) the belief that certain
subcategories of women when combined with workplace exposure produces a greater evidence of occupational illness in
those women. An example of the first category is requiring certain tests of women not required of men. An example of
the second category is separate treatment of all women employees based on scientific data that suggests, for example, that
they live longer and therefore should contribute more to pensions. An example of the third category is what Rothstein calls
"sex plus" discrimination: disparate treatment of a subclass of one sex, such as a policy to exclude pregnant women from
certain hazardous jobs. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1457-58 and cases cited therein. It appears that these categories are
not necessarily limited to women, but also describe possible discriminatory treatment under genetic testing practices.
Clearly, the imposition of a certain genetic test on a certain subcategory of employees (those of Eurasian descent, for
example) constitutes a prima faie case of disparate treatment as does the exclusion of a subcategory of employees (based
on national origin, for example) because of scientific evidence of their higher susceptibility to certain chemicals and the
separate treatment of blacks who have a sickle cell trait from those who do not.
100. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Because it is a tremendous
burden on the employee to prove an employer's discriminatory intent, the courts allow the introduction of statistical
evidence to infer a discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. Note, supra note 12, at 1200.
101. Section 703(e)(1) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to hire and employ employees, ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976 and Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). The language "necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business" has been interpreted to mean that a bfoq is valid only where the essence of the business operation
would be undermined without it. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971).
102. The Interpretative Memorandum of Senators Clark and Case provides the basis for this narrow construction in
the legislative history. See H.R. Res. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 Co-,o. Rec. 7213 (1964). Furthermore, the EEOC
guidelines drafted in 1965 emphasize the limitations of the exception, and court cases make it clear that the defense was
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex and that
in order to rely on the bona fida occupational qualification exception an employer has the burden of proving that
he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (a bfoq based on gender for the position of flight attendant did not satisfy 703(e)(1) stipulation
of necessary to the normal operation of an airline), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977) (because of the peculiarly hostile environment of a male prison, prisons can exclude women from
guard positions).
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Assuming, arguendo, that an employer could raise this defense in the face of a
charge of disparate treatment of a protected class (national origin or religion in the
ethnic sense) pursuant to a genetic test, the employer would have to prove that "the
essence of the business operation would be undermined" 10 3 without the exclusion of
such persons. To apply this defense to justify exclusion of certain workers on the basis
of a genetic abnormality, an employer would have to establish that "all or substan-
tially all"0 4 of those workers who had such a genetic abnormality "would be unable
to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved" 10 5 such that the
operation of the employer's business was undermined. On this basis, an employer
would not be able to show that those he prescreened for genetic abnormalities were
unable to perform a given job.10 6 To date, courts have not recognized that the essence
of a business operation would be undermined when the claim is based on potential
harm to prospective employees. 107 Instead, the employer is required to prove that a
substantial safety risk to the public at large, clients, or other employees necessitates
the exclusion of a given class of persons. 0 8 However, a bfoq defense by the employer
based on genetics would fail because genetic testing neither protects the public at large
nor fellow workers.10 9 Furthermore, an employer must prove impracticability or
impossibility of evaluating the class members individually before excluding an entire
class.' 10 Because a genetic test is done on an individual basis, it is clear that such a
defense would fail."' Since the purpose of genetic testing is identifying hypersus-
ceptible workers to protect them from a toxic workplace, and not to protect the safety
of others, the employer has no legal justification for excluding workers subject to the
bfoq exclusion. If such an employee is willing to engage in employment despite his
hypersusceptibility, Title VII currently requires the employer to allow the employee
to make that decision." 2
103. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(emphasis in original).
104. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Note, supra note 12,
at 1205.
105. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
106. The issue of hypersusceptibility focuses on the employee's health rather than the ability of such an employee
to safely and efficiently perform a given job. Note, supra note 12, at 1206 n.93.
107. Id. at 1207. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (certain protective
legislation held to be in conflict with the nondiscriminatory intent of Title VII); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (protective legislation held invalid).
108. Crowell & Copus, Safety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and Title VII Clash over Health Hazards in the
Workplace, 2 lIans. REL. L.J. 567, 583 n.79 (1978). See also Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974) (employer justified no-hire over age forty policy by establishing that entry level assignments were extremely taxing
and passenger safety might be at stake), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
109. Note, supra note 12, at 1207.
110. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969) ("It may be that where an
employer sustains its burden in demonstrating that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with [class members] on
an individualized basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule."). Id.
111. Note, supra note 12, at 1206.
112. Id. at 1207. To date, courts have not recognized that harm to a job applicant, such as one's hypersusceptibility
to certain toxins, undermines or places a substantial risk on the employer's business. Id. Furthermore, Title VII has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow a worker to make the choice to work in a hazardous work environment as long
as the hazard posed is only to the worker. "the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women may
appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice
for herself." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (Title VII requires the employer to allow an individual
to decide whether a job is too dangerous unless there is a danger to coworkers or the public at large if he accepts such
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2. Pretextual Discrimination
The second theory under which a suit of this nature may be analyzed is the
pretext theory which applies to seemingly neutral policies adopted by the employer,
but which the employee can prove are pretextual for prohibited discrimination.11 3 The
McDonnell Douglas proof scheme i t4 essentially was created to address this type of
disparate treatment where the employee simply claims that the employer's policy,
while facially neutral, covertly treated the claimant "less favorably than others
because of... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '" 115 The employer's only
defense to this cause of action is denial. The difficulty with this approach is proving
an intent to discriminate; it can only be proved circumstantially once the employer has
denied it.t16
3. Disparate Impact
In contrast to disparate treatment cases, the claimant under a disparate impact
theory need not prove intentional discrimination but only that a facially neutral policy
has a disproportionate impact on his protected class. 117 The scheme of proof in such
cases provides that once the employee has established a prima facie case, 118 the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the discriminatory practice is a business
necessity 19 or necessary to safe and efficient job performance. 120 Even if the
employment); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Pursuant to Burdine, an employer may
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut an employee's prima facie case of discrimination as satisfied by
the requirements of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The burden is then shifted to the employee
to show that the employer's reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697
F.2d 1172, 1185 n.20 (4th Cir. 1982).
116. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 567-77 (1978); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185
n.20 (4th Cir. 1982).
117. The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (consequences of
application of general intelligence test for minority groups which have a disparate impact are discriminatory), is the origin
of this interpretation of the language of Title VII. Griggs is the first case to suggest that a claimant may have a cause of
action under Title VII without proving an employer's discriminatory intent: "[tlhe Act proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431. See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (employer practices selected employees in a discriminatory pattern); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (those facially neutral employment practices which fall more harshly
on protected classes are discriminatory).
118. Under a disparate impact theory, the claimant may establish a prima facie case by proving "1) the occurrence
of certain outwardly neutral employment practices, and 2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons
of a particular [protected class] produced by the employer's facially neutral acts or practices." Spaulding v. University
of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 705 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
119. The business necessity defense had its origins in discriminatory hiring cases in which employers relied on hiring
requirements purportedly related to the employee's job performance. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
the Supreme Court held that the hiring criteria used by the employer (necessity for a high school diploma and achievement
on a written examination) which excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants did not sufficiently relate to job
performance to qualify as a business necessity. The Supreme Court applied the same reasoning in another case when the
court disallowed an employer's height and weight requirements for the position of prison guard which disqualified a
disproportionate number of female applicants on the theory that such requirements had not been shown to be necessary
for efficient job performance. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
120. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, implied that business necessity need not be synonymous with
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employer meets this burden, the employee may still prevail if he can prove, once
again, that the stated business necessity is simply a pretext for discrimination.12 1 Such
proof may be satisfied by evidence that the employer could have used alternative
means to achieve the same purpose with less discriminatory results.122
Relating the disparate impact theory to the practice of testing workers for genetic
predispositions to toxins, the legal problem is whether and on what basis employment
practices purportedly designed to protect workers from occupational disease can be
justified despite their disproportionate adverse impact on worker job opportunities.123
While a cause of action for discrimination based on the use of genetic test results is
much more likely under a disparate impact theory than a disparate treatment theory, 24
application of a disparate impact theory is much more problematic. Although an
employee may be able to produce satisfactory statistical evidence 125 that a genetic
screening test used by an employer has a disparate impact on a protected class, what
justification for such practices may an employer raise to satisfy the business necessity
defense? In general, cases are in agreement that the applicable business necessity test
is not whether a business purpose exists to justify a particular employer practice, but
whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice
is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. 2 6 However, two
threshold questions about this defense must be addressed in order to determine the
job-relatedness. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 n.5 (1977). Also, at least one commentator has
suggested that the interpretation of Griggs is that the employer must prove business necessity or that the requirement be
related to job performance. G. RumsREN, MAJOR IssuEs N Tm FEDERAL. LAw oP E r ' 5 om'nmr DlscRisiAloN. 17 (1983). In
general, however, courts have accepted the defense as twofold, and several courts have expanded the defense requirements
such that an employer must prove "an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary for the
safe and efficient operation of the business." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,246 n.91 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979).
121. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804-05 (1973). Since a discrimination case premised on a disparate impact theory does not necessitate that the plaintiff
prove discriminatory animus to establish a prima facie case, then it also must stand to reason that the plaintiff may prove
pretext for discrimination to overcome a business necessity defense with something less than outright evidence of actual
discriminatory intent. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
122. The genesis for the "less discriminatory alternatives doctrine" is the Supreme Court's observation that an
employer practice which is less discriminatory in impact and which serves as good a purpose as a discriminatory practice
must be used in preference to the latter. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In Albermarle, the
Supreme Court struck down standardized tests used by an employer as access to skilled job positions which had a disparate
impact on black job applicants as not being job related. Id. at 405. The Court noted in its opinion, however, that even
if the tests were found to be job related, they could still be struck down if an equally valid predictor of job qualifications
would exclude fewer black applicants. Continued use of the discriminatory test in the face of valid alternatives without
discriminatory impact would evidence a pretextual basis for a discrimination charge. Id. at 436. See also Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
123. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188 (4th Cir. 1982).
124. In today's social and legal climate it seems much more likely that an employer would refuse to hire or promote
all members of a racial group because of a scientifically proven predisposition to an occupational illness of some members
in that group. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1453. "Employers are more likely to use neutral medical criteria or screening
tests that have a disparate impact on a particular class of persons because of race, color, religion [in the ethnic sense], or
national origin." Id.
125. Statistics may be used as circumstantial evidence to prove differences in treatment or impact among employees
or job applicants. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977).
126. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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outcome of a claimant's case under a genetic discrimination argument: 1) may the
protection of workers from the possibility of future occupational illness be properly
considered a "business necessity"? and 2) how can a practice which excludes
workers on the basis of possible future illness be related to the requisite job
performance criterion? Clearly, the fact situation presented by genetic discrimination
fails to fit neatly into traditional definitions of business necessity and job relatedness.
The business necessity defense is a judicially created doctrine which allows an
employer to justify a discriminatory practice. 127 The doctrine was first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.128 which related it to the use of
employment testing and educational requirements' 29 which had a disparate impact on
black job applicants. The Court held that the employer must prove that the tests and
educational requirements bear a demonstrable relationship to job performance.' 30
Since Griggs, the business necessity doctrine has been extended by the circuit courts
to include employer policies or standards which are justified by issues of workplace
safety,' 3' not simply ability tests. "The test is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business."1 32 The Supreme Court has defined the test in terms of
whether the practice is necessary to "safe and efficient job performance."' 133
To assert the business necessity defense in connection with genetic testing, the
test arguably must relate to the particular job 34 and be necessary for the safe and
127. Comment, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CAtIF. L. REv. 1113, 1129 (1977).
128. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
129. The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs directed itself specifically to the interpretation of Section 703(h) of
Title VII which states in relevant part:
[N]or shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
29 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 and Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has interpreted Griggs to apply
to other than ability tests as specified under § 703(1). Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Thus, the business
necessity defense has been enlarged to apply more generally to employer practices which have workplace safety and
efficiency as their justification. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. The expansion of Griggs to encompass
employer practices beyond ability tests as falling within the business necessity defense justifies analyzing genetic testing
within this framework even though it is arguably not strictly an ability test. However, it may also be argued that such a
test is indeed an index of the employee's ability to perform the job safely in the future without endangering himself.
130. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
131. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1976); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971) (employer may impose strict standards in hiring criteria if such standards contribute to safety). The Eleventh Circuit
has extended the defense to include employer concern for fetal safety. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543,
1552 (1 Ith Cir. 1984) (court simply recognized fetal protection as a "legitimate area of employer concern to which the
business necessity defense extends"). Id.
132. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The Fourth
Circuit has also accepted this interpretation of business necessity under certain conditions. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 697
F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (employer established a policy of prohibiting women of childbearing age from working in
certain jobs due to risk to fetuses). Although the policy was struck down as discriminatory because it failed to satisfy the
business necessity defense, the court did suggest circumstances under which such practices would constitute a successful
business necessity defense. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit stated that justification
for this extension rests in proof of a genuine desire on the part of the employers to promote the health of the employee's
offspring. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n. 15 (11 th Cir. 1984). ("[U]nder our formulation
of business necessity, the defense in a fetal protection case is justified by a genuine desire to promote the health of
employee offspring, not by self interest."). Id.
133. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977).
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also Note, supra note 12, at 1204.
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efficient operation of the employer's business.1 35 Because of the absence of case law
in this area, it is unclear whether avoiding tort liability, 36 reducing workers com-
pensation claims, or the cost of engineering controls in the workplace are business
necessities' 37 and whether the employee's ability to perform the job without risk of
future illness is a job-related characteristic.' 38 To illustrate the problem, take the
example of an employer's use of a blood test to screen for the sickle cell trait among
blacks, the most frequently used test uncovered by the OTA survey.' 39 There is
evidence that sickle cell anemia can be aggravated by certain workplace chemicals,
and thus a company might wish to screen out workers who carry a sickle cell trait.
However, the carrying of one sickle cell trait does not cause anemia. Anemia is the
result of carrying two such traits, one from each parent. Scientists have not yet
established that a single sickle cell trait is harmful or lowers the carrier's resistance
to sickle cell anemia.
If a black were refused employment for having the sickle cell trait, he could bring
a prima facie case of discrimination against the employer because the screening test
had a disparate impact on his race. The burden would then be on the employer to
justify the screening by defending the practice in relation to business needs and
legitimate job requirements. As mentioned previously, it is doubtful that the employer
could justify the tests under the business necessity defense on the basis of cost savings
alone.' 40 The employer must also prove that the policy, requirement, or test is
necessary for the preservation of workplace safety. '4' Yet the issue of whose safety
may be properly considered a question of business necessity remains a difficult
one.' 42 In particular, the question raised is whether an employer may satisfy the
135. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). See generally Note,
supra note 12, at 1204.
136. The circuit courts appear to be in disagreement on this issue. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984), specifically rejected the employer's potential liability from the
possibility of litigation as "too contingent and too broad a factor to amount to a 'business necessity."' Id. at 1553 n. 15.
But see Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court appeared to take an opposite
stand: "[a]lthough concern over fetal health alone is arguably not the province of the employer, but of the mother, the
economic consequences of a tort suit brought against the [defendant] by a congenitally malformed child could be
financially devastating, seriously disrupting the 'safe and efficient operation of the business."' Id. at 992 n. 10 (citations
omitted).
137. Several courts have clearly stated, however, that a business necessity defense may not be based on economic
factors such as avoidance of litigation, workers' compensation claims, and engineering costs of decreasing the incidence
of occupational disease. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Waste & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978); Hayes
v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1Ith Cir. 1984); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662
(2d Cir. 1971).
138. Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 42 (testimony of Dr. Karney).
139. Id. at 16 (statement of Gretchen S. Kolsrud).
140.
Once the employer presents evidence to show that its employment practice is grounded on business necessity,
the courts balance all the relevant factors to determine whether the need for the practice sufficiently outweighs
any disparate impact. In the case of genetic testing, whether avoiding tort liability or costly engineering controls
would be a business necessity is an open question.
Rsoem, supra note 5, at 125. See also Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15 (1lth Cir. 1984)
(employer's potential liability from litigation is too speculative to be considered a business necessity).
141. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
142. Typically, safety as ajustification for upholding certain employer policies under the business necessity defense
has been based on safety to coworkers (employee with bad back may be refused employment if lifting heavy objects which
would endanger coworkers if dropped) or business guests (epileptic may be refused job as bus driver as a seizure would
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business necessity defense by justifying his testing on the basis of protecting
hypersensitive workers from exposure in contrast to the protection of coworkers or the
protection of customers. 143
While no cases have directly discussed the unique application of the business
necessity defense on the theory of protection of a hypersensitive worker from the toxic
workplace, a recent decision by the Fourth Circuit, Wright v. Olin Corp.,44 suggests
that such a defense may withstand judicial scrutiny under Title VII if certain
guidelines are followed. Women employees of the Olin Corporation filed a discrim-
ination suit under Title VII challenging the company's fetal vulnerability program
which established three classifications for female employees. Pursuant to one of these
classifications, all women identified by the company as fertile (those between the ages
of sixteen and sixty-three) were prohibited from holding certain jobs which were
identified with a potential risk to a fetus. Women in this classification could only hold
these jobs if the company physicians had determined that they could not bear
children. 145 The Fourth Circuit vacated that portion of the district court decision
which had found the job classifications nondiscriminatory on the theory that there was
no intent to discriminate and that the fetal vulnerability policy was justified by sound
medical evidence. 146 The circuit court remanded the case for further factual devel-
opment of the issue under certain legal principles which it enunciated in the case.
First,. the Fourth Circuit stated that an adverse effect on women's job opportunities
because of the fetal vulnerability program raised a presumption of discrimination. 147
The court stated, however, that such a presumption could be defeated under the
business necessity test if four criteria were satisfied: 1) the burden of persuasion is on
the employer to establish the signficant risk of harm and the consequential necessity
for the effectiveness of its program; 2) any such program must be supported by the
opinion of qualified objective experts in the relevant scientific fields; 3) there is a
consensus of opinion among experts that sufficient risk exists and is confined to this
class of workers (women in this instance); and 4) there are not any148 "acceptable
alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business
endanger passengers). See, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (transit authority
passenger safety justifies employer policy excluding methadone users from hire); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (airline passenger safety justifies policy of mandatory leave for pregnant stewardesses),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). However, several courts have expanded the business necessity defense to incorporate
justification for exclusion of certain workers under higher societal principles such as concern for an individual worker's
health or safety or the health of an unborn child. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 n.15
(11th Cir. 1984) (rationale in extending the business necessity defense beyond a strict correlation with job performance
and safety to others founded on a higher public policy); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982)
(business necessity need not be justified other than in terms of general societal interest).
143. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982).
144. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
145. Id. at 1182.
146. Id. at 1187.
147. Id. at 1183.
148. The Fourth Circuit's formulation of the business necessity defense was that "no acceptable alternative" should
be part of the employer's burden of establishing the defense. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,798 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). However, in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), the court
retracted from this language in favor of proof of "acceptable alternatives" as the claimant's burden in rebuttal. Id. at 1191
n.29.
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purpose... [of protecting against the risk of harm], or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential ... impact [between women and men workers]. '"149
One author heralded this decision as a preliminary effort by the courts to address
the issue of job discrimination based on genetic testing for two reasons: it implicitly
suggests that employers may conduct genetic testing of employees; and it proposes a
specific test for determining if such screening programs comply with the law. 150 A
note of caution is suggested, however, in adopting the guidelines set forth in the
Wright decision as being indicative of future decisions dealing with genetic testing.
Admittedly, the body of cases dealing with sex discrimination on the basis of fetal
protection are as close to the issue of genetic testing as the courts have yet come;
however, it is difficult to draw such general parallels as were suggested above for one
simple reason: discrimination on the basis of genetic testing affects an individual
worker who is capable of making decisions about his own safety and health in contrast
to the fetal protection cases which deal not with worker protection per se, but with the
protection of a potential third party.
The court in Wright v. Olin Corp. went to great lengths to identify the
relationship that the fetus bore to recognized categories of persons whose safety
represented an overriding business necessity so as to justify such a defense. These
included the overall safety of all workers, licensees, and invitees.15 1 Indeed, the court
made it abundantly clear that the employer may not establish a discriminatory practice
and defend it on the basis of business necessity when such defense has as the core of
its justification the safety or health of a protected class (in this case women) under
Title VII. 152 In contrasting the rights of invitees and licensees to those of the worker,
the court further stated:
Of such licensees and invitees, it cannot be said-as it can of the workers themselves-
that in matters touching their exposure to workplace hazards they, rather than the
149. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1191 (4th Cir. 1982).
150. Podgers, Science Meets "Star Wars:" Genetic Factors in Disease, 12 THE BRai (A.B.A.) 14, 39 (August
1983).
151. The court stated:
For purposes of our analysis, the legitimacy of an employer's purpose to protect by discriminatory means the
safety of the unborn children of workers would appear to lie conceptually somewhere between a purpose to
protect the safety of workers themselves and a purpose to protect that of customers exposed in the normal course
to workplace hazards. In attempting to find the more appropriate analogy as betwen these two objects of safety
concerns, it may be helpful to think of unborn children of workers as a special category-though one with quite
unique characteristics-of all invitees and licensees legitimately on business premises and exposed to any of its
associated hazards. Certainly the safety of unborn children of workers would seem no less a matter of legitimate
business concern than the safety of the traditional business licensee or invitee upon an employer's premises.
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189 (4th Cir. 1982).
152. The court stated:
Though the safety of women workers themselves might be thought the most obvious subject of necessary-hence
legally justifiable--restrictions on their employment opportunities, the opposite of course has been held. Among
the most obvious targets of the sex-discrimination prohibitions of Title VII were those stereotypical assumptions
about women workers' special societal role and physical and emotional vulnerabilities which had generated both
"protective" laws and private practices restricting their employment opportunities. Rooting out those restric-
tions has required that they not be routinely justified under any of the business related defenses. Accordingly,
the general view when these defenses have been raised by employers has been that they must be rejected because
"it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make [the] choice for herself."
Id. at 1188 (citations omitted).
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employer, should have the absolute right of choice as against the right of the employer to
guard against it by measures impinging on protected workers interests.15a
Because of the unique issues inherent in the cases dealing with sex discrimination
and the business necessity defense of fetal protection, this author cautions against
presumptions that analogies exist to genetic testing cases. The critical distinction lies
in the business necessity arguments surrounding protection of third parties and the yet
untested business necessity argument of protecting certain racially identifiable classes
of workers from potential self-harm by foreclosing exposure to that harm. This author
therefore questions whether the defense of business necessity vis-a-vis genetic testing
as it pertains to the issue of "safe and efficient operation of the business" 154 or "safe
and efficient job performance" 155 would succeed. The courts have already borne out
the fact that the avoidance of potential liability and consequent economic loss may not
suffice, standing alone, to establish a business necessity defense 56 pursuant to the
"efficient operation of the business" 157 or "efficient job performance"158 criteria.
Even assuming arguendo that a genetic test is recognized as a business necessity
in that it accomplishes the business purpose of ensuring a safe and efficient work-
place, such a defense will fail if the employee can establish that alternative practices
which are not discriminatory can effectuate the same purpose. 59 In connection with
the utilization of alternate practices, evidence of substantially increased cost or
inconvenience to the employer is not relevant. 160 Typically, alternative practices
would include reduction of exposure levels to toxins in the workplace, utilization of
safety equipment such as masks, or implementation of employee rotation systems. 161
It is not clear, however, how far an employer must go to find less discriminatory
alternative means. The courts tend to agree that an employer need not take extraor-
dinary measures to "cushion the blow for affected employees,"' 162 and "[a] 'less
discriminatory alternative,' therefore, is only that which accords with the employer's
customary practices so amenably that the failure to use the alternative indicates that
the legitimate concerns supporting the challenged standard are pretextual."1 63
153. Id. at 1189. See also id. at n.25. For further discussion of fetal protection policies and civil rights, see Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) ("[lit is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make [thel
choice [to work in a hazardous environment] for herself."); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188 (4th Cir. 1982);
Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);
Finneran, Title VII and Restrictions on Employment of Fertile Women, 31 Lu. L.J. 223 (1980); Williams, Firing the
Women to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII,
69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981).
154. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
155. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977).
156. See Los Angeles Dep't of Waste & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978).
157. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
158. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977).
159. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-02 (1973).
160. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971);
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (convenience is irrelevant to a business necessity
defense), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
161. For a discussion of these alternatives, see Note, supra note 12, at 1214-15.
162. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984).
163. Id.
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A further issue which has been addressed by the legal literature on genetic testing
is whether a job applicant or employee would have a cause of action under Title VII
for refusing to submit to a test which he felt was discriminatory.1 64 Section 704(a) of
Title VII provides that an employer may not discriminate against an employee or job
applicant "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this title."' 65 The employee has a narrow burden of proof under this
section. He need not prove that the test was in fact discriminatory, but only that he
had a good faith belief that the test was discriminatory. 166 If the employee meets this
burden of proof, then pursuant to Title VII he has a right to redress any retaliatory
action which his employee may have taken against him for refusing to submit to a
test.' 67 It therefore appears likely that unless the employer could prove that a test
which singled out a protected class was a business necessity (which this author
believes is unlikely) or that being genetically pure (a clean gene) is a valid bfoq, an
employee could bring a cause of action pursuant to section 704(a) if the employer took
retaliatory action against the employee for refusing to submit to the test. Because Title
VII also protects prospective employees, a job applicant who refused to submit to a
genetic screening test which was allegedly discriminatory (such as a sickle cell test)
could bring a cause of action under this section if he could prove that his refusal to
submit to the test was the basis on which he was refused employment. Thus, until
interpretation of the business necessity defense is extended to include general societal
principles such as protecting certain workers from a toxic workplace because of their
particular hypersensitivity, 68 an employer arguably has no defense under Title VII
for genetic testing today.
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
A second avenue which an employee may pursue over concern that he was
discharged or denied employment based on the results of a genetic test is the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.169 This act requires an employer to take affrmnative action
164. See REroar, supra note 5, at 124; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1466-67.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
166. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1467 and cases cited therein.
167. Rothstein notes that section 704(a) has never been used to decide a case brought by an employee alleging
discriminatory treatment for failure to submit to a test. The issue was raised in one case, Munoz v. Int'l Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, 563 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1977), but was decided on other grounds. See Rothstein, supra note
12, at 1466. Other cases, however, suggest that the protection afforded employees pursuant to this section is expansive.
See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (a male employee who was
discharged for trying to promote equal rights for women at his place of employment was considered protected by Title
VII and therefore had standing to bring a case thereunder).
168. The court in Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), did hold that "under appropriate
circumstances an employer may, as a matter of business necessity, impose otherwise impermissible restrictions on
employment opportunity that are reasonably required to protect the health of unborn children .. . .I" d. at 1189-90
(emphasis added). However, the same considerations surrounding protection of third party interests do not apply to first
party (for example, worker) interests. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text. The court did recognize, however,
that general societal interest may be a valid basis for business necessity since such considerations are currently reflected
in other federal legislation (Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1983); Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1983)). Under current judicial interpretation of Title VII, however, protecting a
worker from a hazard he or she is willing to encounter is not an acceptable societal interest. See Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
169. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
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to employ and promote qualified handicapped individuals. To succeed, the employee
would have to convince the court that his genetic make-up rendered him a handi-
capped individual as such term is defined in the Act. 170
In enacting this statute, Congress "made a commitment to the handicapped that,
to the maximum extent possible, they shall be fully integrated into the mainstream of
life in America." ' 17 1 The Act, as amended in 1974,172 defines a handicapped
individual as anyone who "(A) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such
an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment." 173 Protection from
discrimination by employers is afforded such individuals under section 503174 (affir-
mative action) and section 504175 (nondiscrimination) of the Act. Section 503 requires
that any party who enters into a contract in excess of 2500 dollars with the federal
government take affirmative action to employ and promote qualified handicapped
individuals. 176 Section 504, which covers recipients of federal grants, requires that
such recipients not exclude qualified handicapped persons from participation in, deny
them benefits from, or subject them to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. 177 The obvious limitation of this Act is that it
only protects employees whose employers receive federal funds. 178 Another limita-
tion of the Act for employees is the uncertainty surrounding the right to bring a private
cause of action under the Act. While the courts have generally held that section 503
does not create a private cause of action, courts have disagreed as to whether section
504 so provides. 179
In order to establish a prima facie case under the Act, a plaintiff must establish
that 1) he is a handicapped person under the Act; 2) he is otherwise qualified for the
position sought; 3) he was rejected from the position sought solely on the basis of his
handicap; and 4) the employer of the job or activity in question is a recipient of federal
financial assistance. 18 0
170. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
171. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).
172. Prior to the amended version, the definition of handicapped included only those disabilities which substantially
limited one's employment or ability to obtain employment. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (1973)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. 111978)).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. 11 1978). Based on the breadth of this definition and the implementing
regulations, it is estimated that between 40 to 68 million people are covered by this statute. RPoRT, supra note 5, at 126.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976 & Supp. 111978). This section is implemented by regulations promulgated by the
Department of Labor. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to 741 (1976).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). This section is implemented by regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and welfare. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1981).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
178. While this is indeed a limitation, it has provoked most states to enact their own statutes proscribing employment
discrimination on the basis of a handicap. Because of the jurisdictional limitations of the federal statute, most cases of
handicap discrimination are brought under state laws. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 126.
179. The second, fifth, sixth, and seventh circuits have all had an opportunity to rule on the issue of the existence
of a private cause of action under section 503 and have consistently held there is no right of private action. See McGarity
and Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1059 n.255 for the decisions in those circuits. Those courts which have provided for a
private cause of action under section 504 have done so only in those cases where the primary purpose of the federal aid
was to provide employment. See id. at 1057; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1440.
180. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Doe v. New York Univ., 666
F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
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A threshold question regarding the application of the Act is whether an employee
satisfies the definition of handicapped under the Act. Three critical terms set forth in
the Act's definition of handicapped individuals-physical or mental impairment,
substantially limits, and major life activities-are not elaborated upon in the Act.
However, pursuant to regulations promulgated under section 503 by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), an explanation of these phrases
can be found. A handicapped individual is "'substantially limited' if he or she is
likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment
because of a handicap." 81 "Major life activities" means "functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working. "182 "Physical or mental impairment" is defined as:
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 83
Again, a person is handicapped if he is regarded as having such an impairment. 184
The term "physical or mental impairment," as defined by OFCCP regulations,
is of particular importance in analyzing whether an employee's genetic make-up
places the employee among
those individuals who are perceived as having a handicap, whether an impairment exists
or not, but who, because of attitudes or for any other reasons, are regarded as handicapped
by employers, or supervisors who have an effect on the individual securing, retaining, or
advancing in employment.185
Pursuant to OFCCP interpretation of the Act's definition of handicapped and
supporting case law, it is evident that an employer-perceived handicap renders an
individual subject to protection from discriminatory treatment under the Act. 186
Consonantly, an employee or job applicant who shows a hypersusceptibility to
occupational illness through genetic testing may be protected as handicapped under
current application of the Act.
Although to date there have been no cases brought on the theory that genetic
make-up represents a handicap, a recent case of first impression which is relevant to
our analysis is E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall.18 7 The case addresses issues similar to
those presented by genetic disorders. An example is whether a worker with an
identified physical disability, which does not presently impair his work ability but
which might impair his work ability in the future, falls under the protection of the Act.
181. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.2 (1981).
182. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(G)(2)(ii) (1981) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at § 84.3(j)(2)(i).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
185. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741 (1982) (emphasis added).
186. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text. See also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1442-44.
187. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980). Seealso McGarity&Schroeder, supra note 12,at 1057; Rothstein, supra
note 12, at 142-45.
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In Black, the plaintiff was a carpenter's apprentice, a job which required frequent
bending, twisting, and heavy lifting. The apprenticeship program required eight
thousand hours of work in the field. In May 1976, three years and 3600 hours after
plaintiff had entered the program, his union referred him to E.E. Black, Ltd., a
general construction contractor. The contractor required all applicants to submit to a
preemployment physical examination. Plaintiff was diagnosed as having a congenital
back anomaly which the contractor determined would make him a poor risk for heavy
labor and denied him employment. 188 Plaintiff filed a complaint with the OFCCP
alleging a violation of section 503. The administrative law judge found that the
plaintiff was not a handicapped individual under the Act because the Labor Depart-
ment had failed to prove that the perceived impairment substantially limited a major
life activity of plaintiff-in this case his job. 189 The OFCCP filed exceptions to the
judge's Recommended Decision and Order which were heard by the Assistant
Secretary of Labor' 90 who found in favor of plaintiff. The Assistant Secretary found
that
coverage under the Act did not require a showing that the impairment impeded activities
relevant to many or most jobs, but rather that protection "under the Act is extended to
every individual with an impairment which is a current bar to employment which the
individual is currently capable of performing."' 91
The Assistant Secretary also found that since the perceived impairment prevented
plaintiff from obtaining the job he wanted, he qualified as handicapped under the
Act. 192 Furthermore, the term "impairment" was interpreted to mean "any condition
which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health or
physical or mental activity" resulting in "a current bar to the employment of one's
choice with a federal contractor which the individual is currently capable of
performing." 193
On review, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii found that
the Assistant Secretary's definition of handicapped was overbroad by neglecting the
import of the words "substantially limited." 194 The court held that not every physical
condition that limits employment constitutes a handicap. It emphasized the impor-
tance of a case by case determination as to whether the impairment or perceived
impairment of a rejected, qualified job seeker constitutes a substantial handicap to
employment for that individual. 195 The court stated that the important factors to such
a determination would include analysis of the number and types of jobs from which
the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographic location to which the applicant
has reasonable access, and the individual's own job expectations and training.' 96
188. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Hawaii 1980).
189. Id. at 1093.
190. Id. at 1094.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1095.
193. Id. at 1094.
194. Id. at 1099.
195. Id. at 1100.
196. Id. at 1100-01.
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Utilizing this definition, the court nevertheless concluded that the plaintiff was a
handicapped person subject to the protection of the Act. 197 The court held that the
plaintiff "either had an impairment or was regarded as having an impairment" and
that such "constituted, for him, a substantial handicap to employment" 198 because he
would have been rejected from all or substantially all similar jobs. The court
unfortunately circumvented the issue of whether, as E.E. Black contended, Congress
did not intend to protect job applicants denied employment based on risk of future
injury. 199 The district court did reject, however, the Assistant Secretary's broad
interpretation that physical or mental conditions can never be the basis for rejecting
a qualified handicapped individual "irrespective of the likelihood of injury, the
seriousness of the possible injury or the imminence of the injury. "2oo
The Black case has significance to cases of employment discrimination based on
genetic testing. From the decision, we can conclude that a possibility of future
impairment can be considered an impairment protected under the Act if perceived to
be a handicap by the employer. 201 Further, the decision suggests that a person having
a genetic abnormality which makes him hypersusceptible may be considered handi-
capped under the Act. 202
Assuming that a court would find that an employee with a genetic hypersusce-
ptibility was handicapped, the next element in a plaintiff's prima facie case is proof
that he was otherwise qualified for the position sought.20 3 The regulations to both
sections 503 and 504 of the Act define the term "otherwise qualified handicapped."
The Department of Labor defines a qualified handicapped person as one "who is
capable of performing a particular job, with reasonable accommodation to his or her
handicap," 204 while the HEW regulations provide that a qualified handicapped person
is a person who "with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of the job in question. "205 The Supreme Court has defined the term "otherwise
qualified handicapped" as simply one who can satisfy all of a program's requirements
despite his handicap. 20 6 This clearly does not mean, however, that an employer may
197. Id. at 1103.
198. Id. at 1102.
199. Id. at 1103.
200. Id. at 1104.
201. Id.
202. Id. See also Rrpoir, supra note 5, at 128.
203. See supra note 180 and accompanying text for the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Act.
204. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.2 (1981).
205. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1981). The discrepancy in the language
between the two sets of regulations was justified by the Secretary of HEW who suggested that the purpose of the additional
words "essential functions" to the regulations of section 504 was "useful in emphasizing that handicapped persons should
not be disqualified simply because they may have difficulty in performing tasks that bear only a marginal relationship to
a particular job." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977). See also Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies under
Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 25, 30 (1978).
206. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). In dicta, the Court indicated that even
if an individual could not meet all of a program's requirements, he might still be otherwise qualified. This would occur
under circumstances in which the employer unreasonably refused to accommodate a handicapped person, thereby
discriminating against him. Id. at 412-13. See also Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981)
(the court referred to such a refusal to accommodate a handicapped individual as a "surmountable barrier to discrimi-
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discriminate by establishing restrictive program requirements which serve to screen
out the handicapped.
Once the plaintiff has proved his prima facie case that he is qualified for the job
despite his handicap, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the medical
examination as job related. While the regulations to both sections 503 and 504 provide
for preemployment medical examinations of employees,207 in both instances the
examinations must be job related. This fact is reflected in the regulations interpreting
section 504.208 These regulations provide that job qualifications "which would tend
to exclude handicapped individuals because of their handicap.., shall be related to
the specific job or jobs for which the individual is being considered and shall be
consistent with business necessity and safe performance. ' 209 The regulations to
section 503 place similar restrictions on the employer's job qualification require-
ments. 210 Clearly, the purpose of preserving job opportunities for the handicapped
sets a high standard for those job qualifications which adversely affect the handi-
capped. If a job qualification or medical examination is to be permitted to exclude
handicapped individuals, it must be directly connected with and must substantially
promote "business necessity and safe performance. '"211 Conceivably, under these
three criteria-job relatedness, business necessity, and safe performance of the job-
an employer would be able to justify discrimination on the basis of genetic screening
if the courts accepted a business necessity defense based on future job safety
concerns.212
Once again an analogy may be made to the Black decision in analyzing a genetic
discrimination case. In Black, the court determined that the company's job require-
ment relating to plaintiff's back condition was one that "tended to screen out qualified
handicapped individuals." '2 13 Therefore, the company had the burden of proving the
test was "related to the job for which [plaintiff] was rejected, and that the requirement
is consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of the job.' '214 The
nation"); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Tatro v. State
of Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
207. The adopted regulations interpreting section 504 specifically provide that although medical examinations may
be given to prescreen employees, such medical examinations must be given to all employees. 28 C.F.R. § 41.55, 42.513
(1982). The regulations to section 503 provide that an employer may require a preemployment physical of handicapped
applicants even if it is not required of all applicants. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6 (1982).
208. 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (1982).
209. Id. § 32.14(b). These regulations suggest the same limitations set forth in Title V11 that any discriminatory
practices by an employer must be justified by a showing of business necessity and a relationship to safe performance on
the job. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text discussing these requirements under Title V11.
210. Pursuant to the regulations to section 503, if the employer's job qualifications "tend to screen out qualified
handicapped individuals, the requirements shall be related to the specific job or jobs for which the individual is being
considered and shall be consistent with business necessity and the safe performance of the job." 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-741.6(c)(2) (1982).
211. 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (1982).
212. See RE'oRT, supra note 5, at 129; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1442. As discussed in the preceding section on
Title VI, it is unlikely that the courts would adopt a business necessity defense based on economic considerations. See
supra note 137 and accompanying text. However, while it is unclear under Title VII whether a valid defense to a
discriminatory practice is protection of the worker from self-harm, it is clear under the Rehabilitation Act that such
justification is more readily acceptable. See McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1051 n.217.
213. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1103 (D. Hawaii 1980).
214. Id.
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court in Black rejected the company's business necessity defense based on concern
over increased workers' compensation costs and OSHA compliance.21 5 The court, in
refusing to address the issue of whether the risk of possible future injury could be a
defense to a discriminatory practice, stated:
The Court has no doubt that in some cases a job requirement that screens out qualified
handicapped individuals on the basis of possible future injury, could be both consistent
with business necessity and the safe performance of the job. However, at this stage in the
case the Court is not prepared to formulate a legal standard. 216
The EEOC guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures which have been
cited with approval by the Supreme Court also raise questions about the use of ge-
netic tests to screen employees. 21 7 The guidelines state that "discriminatory tests
are impermissible unless shown, by professionally accepted methods, to be predic-
tive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evalu-
ated. "218 Pursuant to this criteria, it was necessary for the company in Black to
prove: 1) an important element of the job was the lifting of heavy objects; 2) em-
ployees with back problems would be unable to satisfactorily perform the job; and
3) the testing required of job applicants had a high predictive value in determining
the likelihood that the individual would sustain such on-the-job injuries.2 19 Apply-
ing a similar analysis to genetic screening, the burden on the employer would be to
prove: 1) an important element of the job was working with certain toxins; 2)
hypersusceptible employees were unable to satisfactorily perform the job; and 3)
genetic screening has a high predictive value in determining the likelihood that the
individual would become hypersusceptible.
Even if the employer were to satisfy the above criteria, the regulations to both
sections 503 and 504 require that an employer make "reasonable accommodation"
for the handicapped individual. 220 The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that
an employer need not accommodate a handicapped individual if 1) such accommo-
dation would necessitate modification of the essential nature of the program; and 2)
it would place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the recipient of the fed-
eral funds. 22' Although the regulations to section 503 do not define reasonable ac-
commodation, one view suggests that it includes "making facilities accessible, re-
structuring jobs, modifying work schedules, acquiring or modifying equipment or
devices, adjusting or modifying examinations appropriately" and other similar ac-
tion.222 It has been proposed that reasonable accommodations for hypersusceptible
215. Id. at 1095. For other economic justifications for discriminatory practices based on genetic tests which an
employer might proffer, see Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1445.
216. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1104 (D. Hawaii 1980).
217. RErojr, supra note 5, at 129.
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1980).
219. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 129-30.
220. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 412 (1979); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.6(d)
(1982).
221. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-13 (1979).
222. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1450.
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workers would mean "shift rotation, dividing maximum exposure time, more fre-
quent monitoring and medical surveillance, and the added use of personal protec-
tion equipment.''223 The issue of accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act
raises the question of whether an employer might be obligated to reduce exposure
levels for various toxins below the standards required by OSHA to accommodate
the handicapped. 224
C. State Antidiscrimination Laws
Of fundamental importance in analyzing statutory protection for hypersuscept-
ible workers at both the state and federal levels is the definition of the term
"handicapped" and the scope of the qualification that the handicap be job related.
More cases dealing with the qualification that the handicap be job related have
appeared at the state than at the federal level. 225 Furthermore, forty-two states and the
District of Columbia have some form of antidiscrimination statute concerning the
handicapped. 226 Oddly, however, nearly all of the reported handicap cases have been
decided under the laws of New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. 22 7
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has read that state's Fair Employment Act228
so as to protect a wide range of handicapped individuals. In one case the court found
that a person refused employment because of a history of asthma was covered by the
Act, stating: "If the individual can function efficiently on the job, then the mere fact
that he is different from the average employee as to those statutorily proscribed bases
[for example, female, old, handicapped] may not be used as a basis for discrimina-
tion. '"229 The court went on to define a handicap as "a disadvantage that makes
achievement unusually difficult; esp[ecially]: a physical disability that limits the
capacity to work." 230
In another Wisconsin case, 231 an applicant was denied employment because he
had only one kidney and the job required that he work on stainless steel tanks ten to
twelve feet above a concrete floor. The company acknowledged that the plaintiff was
qualified for the job, but was concerned that a fall would damage his remaining
kidney and cost the company substantial outlay in workers' compensation.2 32 The
court found that the complainant was protected by the Wisconsin Fair Employment
Act even though his condition did not hinder his present ability to perform the job
because of a "perceived sensitivity to injury in the future. ' ' 233 According to this
223. REPmRT, supra note 5, at 130.
224. Id.; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1451.
225. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1053.
226. For a list of the forty-two states and their statutory citations, see Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1436-37 n.392.
227. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1053.
228. Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.37 (West 1974).
229. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co. v. State, Dep't of I., L. & H.R., 62 Wis. 2d 392, 397, 215 N.W.2d 443,445
(1974).
230. Id. at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
231. Dairy Equip. Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 95 Wis. 2d 319, 290 N.W.2d 330 (1980).
232. Id. at 321-22, 290 N.W.2d at 332.
233. Id. at 330, 290 N.W.2d at 335.
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judicial interpretation of the term "handicapped," it appears that an applicant denied
employment based on genetic screening has a valid cause of action under Wisconsin's
handicap statute. 234
In the state of Washington, the supreme court also has applied a broad inter-
pretation to the term "handicapped." A handicap is "a condition that prevents normal
functioning in some way. ' 235 As one author notes, "[t]his expansive reading of the
prohibition on discrimination against the handicapped could lead to the elimination of
all physical and mental criteria not necessary for the job.' 236
Although the claimant may be successful on a cause of action for discrimination
pursuant to genetic testing because of the Wisconsin and Washington Supreme
Courts' interpretations of the term "handicapped," the claimant would not fare so
well in either the state of Illinois or North Carolina. In Illinois, the court of appeals
limited a handicap to mean "physical and mental conditions which are generally
believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major
life functions.'' 237 The court specifically eschewed the Wisconsin and Washington
court interpretations. 238 The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the term
narrowly such that an applicant who was refused employment because of glaucoma
was not protected by the act as handicapped because he had 20/20 vision. 239 Still other
states limit the definition of handicapped statutorily. The Hawaiian statute defines a
handicap as "a substantial physical impairment where such handicap is verified by
medical findings and appears reasonably certain to continue throughout the lifetime
of the individual without substantial improvement.' '240
Thus, there is no consensus among the state courts as to what is protected under
handicap legislation, and it would be difficult to determine (except perhaps in the case
of Washington and Wisconsin) which states would consider a genetic differential a
handicap. Some states, however, have confronted the issue directly by specifically
proscribing discriminatory use of certain genetic screening tests in the workplace. For
example, Florida,241 Louisiana, 242 and North Carolina243 all prohibit discrimination in
employment based on the sickle cell trait. New Jersey has adopted a much more
comprehensive statute which specifically proscribes employment discrimination on
the basis of an individual's "atypical hereditary cellular blood trait." 244 This has been
234. Indeed, one author has noted that the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act is sufficiently broad so as to strike down
any unnecessary employment screens if they result in the exclusion of applicants who are otherwise qualified. See
McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1054.
235. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802,805,557 P.2d
307, 310 (1976). See also Kimmel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 82, 596 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1979)
(handicap means abnormal).
236. McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1055.
237. Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 516-17, 385 N.E.2d 39, 43
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
238. Id. at 516, 385 N.E.2d at 43.
239. Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 298 N.C. 520, 259 S.E.2d 248 (1979).
240. HAwAII REv. STAT. § 378-1(7) (1976).
241. See FLA. STAT. Arm. 760.10 (West Supp. 1985).
242. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46.2254 (West 1982).
243. See N.C. GN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (1981).
244. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1985).
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defined to include sickle cell trait, hemoglobin C trait, thalessemia trait, Tay-Sachs
trait, or cystic fibrosis trait.245
A number of cases under state handicap discrimination statutes have addressed
the relationship between job criteria and exclusion of applicants from jobs on the basis
of possible future risk of injury. In a recent California decision,2 46 the court held that
the employer's evidence, at best, showed only a possibility that the employee might
endanger his health sometime in the future because of a handicap to the lower back.
Consequently, this evidence was not a sufficient basis for refusing him employment
as a truck driver. 247 In another decision, the Supreme Court of California held that an
employer could not refuse work to an applicant for a sales job on the basis that he
might become handicapped in the future due to high blood pressure. 248 Similarly, in
a New York case involving discrimination on the basis of high blood pressure, the
court identified the central issue as whether the complainant's physical condition
related to her ability to engage in the duties of the job she was denied. 249 In another
New York case, Westinghouse Electrine v. State Division of Human Rights,250 the
court found that an applicant's dermatitis was job related where the employer showed
by clear, convincing, and uncontradicted medical evidence that the applicant's
dermatitis would be exacerbated by exposure to workplace chemicals. 251 In Oregon,
the supreme court applied a standard similar to that of California in reviewing the
denial of employment for a salesperson job. The basis for denial was that the applicant
had suffered sporadic angina and was thus a likely candidate for a heart attack. 25z The
court, in discussing the relationship between job requirements and future risk of
injury, set up a standard which imposed upon the employer
the obligation not to reject a prospective employee because of a physical or mental
handicap unless there is, because of the defect, a probability either that the employee
cannot do the job in a satisfactory manner or that he can do so only at the risk of
incapacitating himself.n3
In general, the courts in the above states place a difficult burden on the employer
to establish either a reasonable probability that the handicapped worker will suffer
additional injury in the future or inability to perform so as to justify a decision by an
employer not to hire such an applicant. Thus, it would appear that under these state
statutes an employee who was discriminated against on the basis of a genetic test
would succeed in his cause of action. An employer would have a difficult burden to
245. See REPORT, supra note 5, at 128.
246. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981).
See also State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 149 Cal. App. 3d 429, 196 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1983).
247. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d, 791, 799, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548,
552 (1981).
248. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982).
249. Amot Ogden Mem. Hosp. v. State Div. of Human Resources, 67 A.D.2d 543, 546, 416 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373
(1979).
250. 63 A.D.2d 170, 406 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978).
251. Id. at 172, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
252. In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977).
253. Id. at79 (emphasis added). AccordPacific MotorTrucking Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 64 Or. App. 361, 668 P.2d
446 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Chicago and N.W. R.R., 98 Wis. 2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980).
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overcome in utilizing genetic screening which evidences a possibility (not even a
probability) of future disability on behalf of the applicant.
D. Privacy Rights, Confidentiality, Right to Know, and Informed Consent
Yet another concern of workers over the use of genetic testing in the employment
setting addresses personal privacy issues. 254 In particular, employee concerns focus
on the constitutionally protected right to privacy, confidentiality of the results of the
tests, right to know of the results of the tests, and informed consent to the tests.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a general constitutional right to
privacy, 255 there is to date no recognized constitutional 256 or common law right257 to
privacy within the employment setting in regard to employer testing. In other words,
absent statutory prohibition25 8 or specific limitations on testing in collective bargain-
ing agreements, 259 an employee must either comply with preemployment physical
examination requirements (including genetic testing) or on-the-job physical exami-
nations (including genetic monitoring) or suffer the consequences (including loss of
employment). 26° An advisory commission created by The Privacy Act of 1974261
made recommendations that individuals be given the right to grant or withhold
medical information from their employment files. 262 However, this recommendation
has yet to be acted upon.
In addition to employee concern over whether the employer may extract certain
private health information from the employee, there is concern over dissemination of
the information acquired by the employer. Although the common law physician-
patient privilege requires confidentiality of information given to the physician by the
patient, this privilege does not extend to the relationship between the company
254. Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17, at 32 (testimony of Sheldon Samuels) ("[c]onfidentiality, access to
records for research, treatment and compensation, physician independence must be guaranteed").
255. The Supreme Court has recognized as protected under a consitutional right to privacy issues covering
procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)), contraception (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)), and
abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); T. HAYDEN, YouR
RIGHTs To PRivAcy (1980); Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices, supra note 29, at 134. However, the constitutional
right to privacy is not absolute, but may be tempered by state or federal regulation concerning health and safety. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("The Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some
state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.").
256. The constitutional right to privacy is only applicable to state or federal government action. There is not
equivalent limitation on actions by private industry unless state or federal law is applicable.
257. See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (employees' claim of invasion
of privacy by their employer for requiring completion of medical questionnaire was denied).
258. Maryland is one of the few states which has enacted a statute limiting the employer's right to require information
of employees for job applications. See Mo. ANN. Cooe art. 100, § 95A (1979).
259. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1471. It is not typical for a collective bargaining agreement to contain
limitations on the amount or substance of information an employer can require his employees to provide. To date, unions
have not been overly concerned with their constituents' right to privacy. On the other hand, unions have been concerned
about dissemination to employees of information concerning toxic substances which has resulted in state and federal right
to know legislation. See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
260. However, if an employee believes that a test is discriminatory, he may, pursuant to § 704(a) of Title VII, refuse
to submit to the test and cannot be retaliated against for doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1976 and Supp. 1979). See also
supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1471 n.595 and cases cited therein.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
262. See generally TE PRIVACY CoMISSION REco.mENDAT I N oN E.uvLoEE AccEss IN INDI IDUAL RIGTs IN TE CoR'ORATION
(A. Westin & S. Salisbury eds. 1980).
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physician and the employee.263 Most jurisdictions hold that the physician's respon-
sibilities, if performed on behalf of the employer, render him responsible solely to the
employer.264 Consequently, the employee is unaware of the potential hazards, thus
the decision of whether or not to leave the employee in that environment is left to the
employer by default to be based on the employer's interpretation of the tests. 265
Because genetic information may be helpful by warning of hypersusceptibility or
predisposition to disease, test results may be important to workers' families or even
to coworkers. 266 Under these circumstances, a company physician may have a duty
to disseminate the information to others at risk.2 67 Furthermore, the National Labor
Relations Board has held that a union was entitled to receive medical information
acquired by the employer concerning his employees when toxic substances were
involved. 268 The Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians Providing Occupational
Medical Services269 even provides that the physician is to treat as confidential
whatever is learned about the individual employee. However, "employers are entitled
to counsel about the medical fitness of individuals in relation to work, but are not
entitled to diagnoses or details of a specific nature.''270 Pursuant to regulations
promulgated by OSHA, employers are required to release employee medical records
to the government upon request. 27' The regulations, however, do contain prohibitions
on dissemination of the information and requirements for confidentiality, as well as
a requirement that the results of any analysis done by the agency be communicated
to employees whose personal medical information was used. 272
However, the federal government and at least one state, California, have taken
steps to limit the disclosure of information obtained by the employer about his
employees. The Privacy Act of 1974273 limits the federal government's right to
maintain information about employees, grants employees access to their records, and
limits dissemination of such information to third parties. 274 Pursuant to California's
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, 275 employers may not disclose an
employee's medical records. The California law provides a private right of action
affording the aggrieved employee punitive damages up to three thousand dollars as
well as compensatory damages. 276
Yet another concern of the employee is the right to know test results and the risks
to which the employee is being exposed. Presumably, this right is protected by the
263. See infra note 310 and accompanying text.
264. Id.
265. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1473 n.611.
266. Diamond, supra note 12, at 246.
267. Id.
268. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 261 N.L.R.B. 27 (1982).
269. Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians Providing Occupational Medical Services (1976).
270. Id. principle 7.
271. Rules of Agency Practice and Procedure Concerning OSHA Address to Employee Medical Records, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1913.10 (1980).
272. Id.
273. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
274. Id.
275. CAL. CIv. CoDs § 56 (Deering Supp. 1982).
276. Id.
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common law which provides that the employer has a duty to disclose any dangers in
the workplace to the employee.277 This would include the duty to warn of toxic levels
of exposure.278 Legislation at both the federal and state levels also supports the
employee's right to know. In 1983 OSHA announced its final Hazard Communication
Standard2 79 which is intended to give some fourteen million workers in the manu-
facturing sector greater access to information concerning hazards associated with
chemicals in the workplace. OSHA also has promulgated an Access to Employee
Exposure and Medical Records Rule280 which requires access to information by
workers exposed to toxins in the workplace. And finally, nine state legislatures have
adopted worker right to know laws28' requiring disclosure of toxic substances in the
workplace. 282 The federal and state right to know laws, however, only provide
peripheral comfort to employees because they do not deal directly with genetic
testing, do not require employers to disseminate test results to workers, 283 and do not
require the employer to provide protection against the toxins identified. Instead, they
merely provide disclosure of the existence of such toxins.
A final concern of employees over the use of genetic testing by employers deals
with the issue of informed consent. Because the science of genetic testing is at the
embryonic stage, a number of employers engage in such a practice for research
purposes.2 84 In these circumstances, the employer should obtain the employee's
informed consent to perform such tests. To date, there are no statutes or regulations
in the employment area requiring that employers obtain consent from the employee
before engaging in genetic testing. The theory of informed consent has its greatest
application in the medical field when a patient is advised to undergo an operation and
the physician is required to obtain his informed consent to the proceedings.28 5
The consent which justifies what the law calls "intermeddling" with a person's body is
free and informed consent. To be effective the consent must be to the particular contact
with the person in question, and if procured "by fraud or mistake as to the essential
character" of the conduct it is invalid.286
277. See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text. See also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1472; Note,
Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right to Know, 90 YsAM L.J. 1792 (1981).
278. See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
279. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983). The publication of the standard brought an immediate reaction from unions
representing the steel, auto, and chemical industries who challenged the standard's limited application to only the
manufacturing industry. Concern was also expressed over provisions in the standard which preempt state and local right
to know laws. 13 Occup. Ssarrv & HEALTr REP. (BNA) 691 (Dec. 1, 1983).
280. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1981).
281. California, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Louisiana
all have adopted some form of right to know legislation. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 472 n.604 for statutory
references. Another five states-Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Ohio, and Wisconsin-also guarantee employees
access to medical records. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 252 n.139.
282. The duty under these statutes varies greatly from state to state. In Wisconsin, for example, information
concerning toxins in the workplace must be given within fifteen days of request. New York requires employers to set up
educational and training programs for employees concerning the chemical name of the toxin, its effects, and emergency
treatment. Connecticut requires employers to disseminate to employees the chemical names of all hazardous toxins in the
workplace within the first month of employment. Diamond, supra note 12, at 253. State right to know laws, however,
may be limited by the employer's right to protect his trade secrets, such as which chemical is used in the workplace. Id.
283. Id.
284. R.Esor, supra note 5, at 36 (Table 6).
285. See C. Frum, MEntcA. Ex'ERiENSTA-IoN 19 (1974).
286. Id.
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A report, prepared under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, addresses the protection of human subjects in experimentation. 287 The
key recommendation applies to the issue of informed consent. The HEW Report
recommends that subjects be given the opportunity to choose whether or not to
participate. It also requires that subjects be made privy to certain information such as
the research procedure, the purposes of the test, and the risks involved. Subjects
should also be given the rights to ask questions and to withdraw at any time.2 88 The
report does not have the force of law, however. Furthermore, there is no requirement
under federal, state, or common law that the employer reveal the purposes for a blood
test, nor must the employer obtain the employee's permission before taking a blood
sample. As stated earlier in this section, the job applicant or employee must either
consent to the blood test or suffer the consequences. 289
Thus, it appears that an employer is not limited in his right to require employees
or job applicants to submit to medical tests, including blood tests which determine
genetic background. Furthermore, there is only limited protection for an employee
regarding the use of test results. Although legislation has been enacted requiring the
employer to disseminate information concerning toxins in the workplace, employers
are not required to disseminate test results or to necessarily provide protection against
the disclosed toxin. Finally, employers are not required to disclose the purpose of the
test to employees nor honor the right to refuse to participate.
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR GENETIC TESTING OF EMPLOYEES OR JOB
APPLICANTS
It is estimated that the cost of work-related injuries and illness in the United
States is close to twenty-three billion dollars annually. 290 Despite denials from
business that genetic screening is used to minimize the cost of doing business by
excluding those who are hypersusceptible, 291 the practical economics of the business
world suggest such an application. Genetic tests theoretically can provide employers
with information concerning an employee's or prospective employee's health on the
job over the long term. An employee's health is likely to affect his productivity on
the job, in particular his absenteeism rate. 292 Hypersusceptible employees arguably
would take more sick leave and be responsible for a higher turnover rate, necessitating
287. Tim NATIONAL Co.MnMsION FOR THE PROTCnON OF HuMAN SuBJEcrs oF BIommEicAL ANo BEHAvioRAL REsEARc, Tim
BEu.o.rr REPORT (April 18, 1979).
288. Id. at 5.
289. See supra note 260.
290. W.F. GLUEcK, PEssosss: A DIACNOSmC APROACH I (1982).
291. See Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17, at 262 (testimony of Dr. Bruce W. Karrh). Dr. Karrh stated:
The DuPont Co. does not exclude individuals as a substitute for achieving safe exposure levels. If individuals
are adversely affected by the chemical exposure in their jobs, DuPont will investigate the situation and then
implement appropriate engineering controls, work practices, personal protective equipment or a combination of
all these changes as necessary to eliminate the exposure. . . . Thus, at DuPont we do not substitute medical
testing and removal for improvements in workplace quality. . . . If we cannot manufacture a product without
creating undue risks to our employees, we will not manufacture it at all.
292. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1445 n.437.
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expenditures in hiring and training new workers. 293 The economic benefits of genetic
screening for employers could be reflected in fewer workers' compensation claims
filed, lower probability of civil litigation, and an overall decrease in insurance
costs. 294 It has even been suggested that employers might suffer a loss of goodwill by
generating adverse publicity for the company if they failed to use genetic screening
or monitoring and this failure caused the birth of a defective child because of parental
exposure to toxins in the workplace.2 95 Thus, it is not surprising that a fair number
of companies in the OTA study acknowledged an intent to implement genetic testing
in the near future. 296 Yet great uncertainty surrounding the legal ramifications of
implementing such practices haunts the employer. In particular, employers should be
concerned with the spectre of liability including common law action for wrongful
discharge, negligence, or intentional torts, and violations under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act for failure to make the workplace safe. This section will review
potential liability for genetic testing under both common law and OSHA from the
employer's perspective.
A. Common Law Liability of the Employer
An employer's common law liability for genetic testing may arise under two
circumstances: genetic screening and genetic monitoring. Despite the fact that
workers' compensation laws have largely preempted the field of employer tort
liability for injuries to their employees, an employer may still be found liable for
negligence under certain circumstances. 297 In general, an employer retains a common
law duty to provide employees with a safe and healthy work environment. 298 The
293. Id.
294. Id.; See also Note, supra note 12, at 1194-95; Panel Discussion: The Role of the Knowledge of High Risk
Groups in Occupational Health Policies and Practices, 29 Euv'. HEAL.-m P-Rsp. 143, 148-49 (1978).
295. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1445.
296. R oRT, supra note 5, at 34.
297. Workers' compensation statutes are now in effect in every state. They provide for compensation of employees
who prove that their injuries arose out of and in the course of their employment. See generally A. So.%tE.s & H. So.Mss,
WomxE.s' Co.PEsATnoN (1954). All workers' compensation statutes provide that "the compensation remedy is exclusive
of all other remedies [including those at common law] by the employee or his dependents against the employer and
insurance carrier for the same injury, if the injury falls within the coverage formula of the Act." A. LARSON, 2A WoRiEN's
CO.ENSA11ON LAw § 65.10, at 12-4 (1982). The coverage under workers' compensation has been extended to include
certain occupational diseases; however, the employer often has difficulty proving job relatedness because most occupa-
tional diseases do not manifest themselves until many years later. See Note, supra note 12, at 1195. However, if the injury
or disease does not fall within the coverage formula of the act, then the employee may avail himself of his common law
remedies including a cause of action for negligence or intentional tort. A. LARSoN, supra note 297, § 65.00, at 12-1.
Furthermore, the exclusive remedy rule generally only applies to causes of action for damages; an employee may still seek
injunctive or declaratory relief. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1481. Application of such a right is illustrated in a New Jersey
case where an employee sought injunctive relief to require his employer to prohibit smoking in certain areas. The court
allowed the employee's prayer for injunction stating that he had a right at common law to a healthful work environment.
See Shimp v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div. 1976).
298. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Kirnbler v. Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R., 331 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964); Emig v. Erie Lackawanna Ry., 350 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 485
F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Rickett v. Jones R.R., 495 F.2d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1974); Foreman v. Dorsey Trailers,
Inc., 256 Ala. 253, 54 So. 2d 499 (1951) (employer liable for failing to provide well ventilated workplace resulting in
lead poisoning); Brown v. Sharphauser Contracting Co., 159 Cal. 89, 112 P. 874 (1910) (employer held liable for
negligence in earth cave-in); Nichols v. Harvey Hubbel, Inc., 92 Conn. 611, 103 A. 835 (1918) (employer found liable
for negligent design of platform on which plaintiff was asked to work); Riggs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 211 Kan.
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employer has a further duty to identify latent or hidden dangers known to him or
discoverable by the exercise of reasonable care299 and to disclose such dangers to his
employees. 300 Inherent in the above general duties is the employer's duty to warn his
employees of known or discoverable dangers of occupational disease. 30 1 Further-
more, "[t]he common law imputes to the employer not only a knowledge of the
constituents and general characteristics of the substances used in his or her business,
but also a scientific understanding of their risks."302
In applying these duties to the presence of toxins in the workplace, an argument
is that the presence of such substances constitutes a breach of the employer's common
law duty to maintain a safe workplace-especially for those workers who are
hypersusceptible. 30 3 The existence of such a duty may obligate the employer to take
certain steps to remedy the problem, such as transfer of the employee, utilization of
personal protective devices, rotation of employees, installation of engineering con-
trols, or even the discontinuation of a product. 304 Furthermore, as one author has
noted, both the presence of toxic substances and the known hypersusceptibility of
certain employees to toxins are hidden risks.305 To meet his common law duty, the
employer must then disclose the nature of the toxic substances306 and, when genetic
testing achieves a high probative value, must identify those employees who are
hypersusceptible through such testing.30 7
In addition to the general common law duties identified above, the employer has
several specific duties to job applicants and employees once he decides to embark on
a course of genetic screening or monitoring. These are: 1) a duty to perform any
medical proceedings with care; 2) a duty to warn of a serious medical condition; and
3) a duty to warn of the aggravation of an existing medical condition.
795, 800, 508 P.2d 850, 854 (1973); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975); Occupational Safety
& Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1982); Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 99 51, 54, 56, 60 (1982).
299. See, e.g., Coffee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 551, 503 P.2d 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972)
(although employer has no duty to give employee a preemployment physical, be is liable for negligent performance if he
assumes such duty); Tedford v. Los Angeles Elec. Co., 134 Cal. 76, 66 P. 76 (1901) (employer found liable for failure
to warn worker of a hidden danger). See also Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956);
Harris v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 507 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); Rio Grande S.R.R. Co. v. Campbell, 65 Colo.
217, 176 P. 275 (1918) (duty to discover defective tools); Ft. Smith & W.R.R. v. Holcombe, 59 Okla. 54, 158 P. 633
(1916) (duty to discover defective tools); Lemon v. Lonker, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 240 (1929) (duty to warn of latent defect
in stepladder).
300. See, e.g., Tedford v. Los Angeles Elec. Co., 134 Cal. 76, 66 P. 76 (1901) (employer liable for failure to warn
of danger in handling wires); Hume v. Fort Halifax Power Co., 106 Me. 78, 75 A. 300 (1909) (employer found negligent
for failure to warn of rockslide risk); Clayton v. Ainsworth, 122 N.J.L. 109, 4 A.2d 274 (1939) (employer negligent for
failure to warn of coalslide).
301. See Note, supra note 277, at 1804 n.69.
302. Id. at 1804 n.70.
303. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 248.
304. See Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 25 (Table VIII). These alternative actions are all responses to the
subcommittee survey of the Fortune 500 companies inquiring what action the employers took once an employee was
discovered hypersusceptible.
305. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 249.
306. The employer currently also has a statutory duty to disclose certain toxic substances to his employees under the
Toxic Substances Control Act. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
307. The question of how far the employer's duty to warn extends becomes complicated when the individual's
genetic disorders are of concern to siblings or children who may have acquired the defect. It has been suggested that if
the potential harm to such family members is serious, the employer's duty extends to warning the affected family
members, even if the employee has not so consented. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 249.
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1. Duty Owed Prospective Employees
Generally, the law ascribes no duty to an employer to ascertain whether
prospective employees are physically fit for the employment they seek. However, if
the employer assumes such a duty, he is liable if he performs it negligently. 30 8 A
recent example is a California case, James v. United States.30 9 In James, the plaintiff
brought suit against the government, but not the examining physician, 31 0 for failing
to inform him of the discovery of a suspected tumor in the course of a preemployment
physical. James had applied for a position as a marine machinist and was required to
take a preemployment physical examination. An abnormality was noted in a routine
chest X-ray, and the reviewing radiologist requested further X-rays. Due to clinical
error, both the X-ray and the report were inadvertently filed away. 31' The plaintiff
was awarded sixty thousand dollars on the theory that he would have benefitted from
early treatment following discovery and disclosure of the suspected tumor at the
preemployment physical. 3 12
Similar decisions were reached in two earlier cases, Coffee v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.313 and Betesh v. United States.314 In Coffee, the negligence of the
employer was established when a blood test, taken during a preemployment physical
and indicating a serious abnormality, was inadvertently filed and not reviewed by
physicians. 31 5 In Betesh, the employer's negligence was based on the failure to
disclose to plaintiff an abnormality duly noted on his record by a physician and which
308. See, e.g., James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (United States was negligent when,
through clerical error, X-ray of prospective employee was not brought to attention of examining physician); Betesh v.
United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.C. 1974) (same); Coffee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 551,503 P.2d 1366,
105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Cal. 1972) (employer found liable for negligent failure to make abnormal results of applicant's blood
test available to doctor in preemployment examination). See also Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d
229,232-33 (6th Cir. 1956); Isget v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 332 F. Supp. 1127, 1141 (D.C.S.C. 1971); Gunston
v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 349, 352 (N.D. Cal. 1964), affd, 358 F.2d 303, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 993 (1966);
McQuigan v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 482, 277 P.2d 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). Such an obligation generally
arises from the RFsrmTEmaT (SEco!D) or ToRTs, § 323 (1965) which states in relevant part:
One who undertakes, gratuitiously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize
as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
Id.
309. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
310. Generally when a prospective or actual employee attempts to bring suit against a physician employed by an
employer for the purpose of examining such employees, the courts have held that there is no doctor-patient relationship
between the physician and employee. See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1071, 1073 (1966). Furthermore, courts generally agree
that the standard of care to which the physician is held is not the same for employees or job applicants as it is for the
physician's own patients. See id. at 1074; Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250,203 A.2d 861 (1964); Beadling v. Sirotta,
41 N.J. 555, 197 A.2d 857 (1964). The courts have disagreed on the extent of the duty which exists. The differing views
are: 1) there is merely a duty not to injure; 2) reasonable care is required; and 3) the only duty is to the employer unless
the physician takes it upon himself to advise the patient; then he must act reasonably. Annot., supra note 310, at 1074.
311. James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 583 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
312. The plaintiff was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury for which he sought
damages was proximately caused by a duty the employer owed him. Id. at 585. The court held that "[elvidence which
shows to a reasonable certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment increased the need for or lessened the
effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish proximate cause." Id.
313. 105 Cal. Rptr. 358, 503 P.2d 1366 (1972).
314. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974).
315. Coffee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 385, 365, 503 P.2d 1366, 1373 (1972).
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was in fact the reason for denying him the job.316 Thus, in general, courts have
established the rule that a physician acting as the agent of an employer has the duty
to conduct the examination with care and failure to do so renders the employer liable
for any injuries regardless of whether the injured party is a current or prospective
employee. 317 Similarly, based upon these decisions, one can assume that if an
employer undertakes to ascertain hypersusceptibility of prospective employees
through genetic screening, he is under a duty to perform the test with care and to
disclose any negative findings to the job applicant.
2. Duty Owed Current Employees
If an employer uses genetic monitoring on his employees to measure the level of
exposure to dangerous toxins, he might be subject to a cause of action for negligence
if he fails to warn those employees identified as being at increased risk. The
employer's liability arises from his duty to warn employees of existing medical
conditions318 and his duty to warn of any aggravation of an existing condition. 319
To establish negligence for breach of the duty to warn the employee of an
existing medical condition, the employee must first surmount the exclusive remedy
rule provided by workers' compensation.3 20 The employee must prove that either his
injury is not subject to the statute's jurisdiction, or that the negligent medical services
were provided for his benefit and not that of the company.
An example of the former theory, that the employee's injury is not subject to the
statute's jurisdiction, is Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America.321 In Wojcik, the
plaintiff sued his employer for negligently failing to inform him that physical
examinations had disclosed he was developing tuberculosis. 322 The court noted that
although workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injuries of disease
contracted pursuant to employment, "the plaintiff does not allege that he sustained
any physical injury or disability arising out of or in the course of his employment, or
that he contracted any occupational disease in such employment. ''32 Therefore, the
plaintiff was not foreclosed from maintaining a common law cause of action for the
316. Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 247 (D.D.C. 1974).
317. James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C.
1974); Coffee v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366, 105 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972).
318. Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974) (employer held liable for failure to notify employee
of tumor found during X-ray examination); Bednarski v. General Motors Corp., 88 Mich. App. 482, 276 N.W.2d 624
(1979) (employer liable for failure to detect or reveal lung cancer during employee's physical examination); Wojcik v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959) (employer liable for failure to notify employee that he had
developed tuberculosis). But see Hoesl v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 1170 (1978), affd, 629 F.2d 586 (1980) (employer
not liable for negligent report of psychiatrist which cost plaintiff his job). See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1960).
319. See, e.g., Riste v. General Electric Co., 47 Wash. 2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1956) (employer liable for
aggravating employee's preexisting medical condition by assigning him arduous work despite knowledge of the
condition).
320. See supra note 297.
321. 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959). Accord Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N.Y. 139, 194 N.E. 61 (1934)
(employer was successful in a negligence action against his employee for dust disease prior to its inclusion under workers'
compensation).
322. Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1959).
323. Id. at 354.
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employer's negligence. Similarly, in Bednarski v. General Motors Corp. ,324 the court
found that the estate of the deceased established negligence against the decedent's
employer. The court held that an action may be maintained for failure to detect or
reveal to the decedent the presence of cancer revealed in X-rays of his lungs, provided
such disease neither arose out of or in the course of employment nor was based on the
employment relationship. 325 The court found that workers' compensation would not
bar employee actions against an employer if the employment relationship was only
incidental to the cause of action brought on another basis (in this case, negligence). 326
An example of the latter theory, that the medical examination was conducted for
the employee's benefit, is Betesh v. United States.327 In Betesh, the plaintiff was
refused induction into the Army based on the government doctor's finding of an
abnormality in a chest X-ray taken in his preinduction physical examination. 328
Plaintiff incorrectly assumed he had been rejected on the basis of a previous knee
injury. When the government doctor recalled plaintiff to determine whether his
condition had progressed, the extent of his injury was discovered. 329 Plaintiff argued
that the doctors assumed diagnostic and advisory duties for his benefit alone when
they recalled him to reevaluate his condition, thereby establishing a doctor-patient
relationship with all the requisite duties. 330 An analogous situation is the practice of
certain companies in engaging in genetic testing of employees for the employee's
benefit. 331 Under such circumstances, the Betesh case presents a strong argument for
finding that the company's doctors perform tests for the employee's benefit, and
failure to discover and disclose the results to the participant leads to a cause of
action. 332
Employers may also be held liable in tort for failure to warn employees of the
aggravation of an existing condition. In Riste v. General Electric Co.,333 the
employer, pursuant to an industrial medical program, X-rayed and examined em-
ployees on a regular basis. The plaintiff's X-rays, taken on two different occasions
a year apart, showed active tuberculosis. After each of these examinations, the
company notified the plaintiff that nothing serious was evidenced. The company,
knowing that he had tuberculosis, assigned him to tasks involving physical exertion
324. 88 Mich. App. 482, 276 N.W.2d 624 (1979).
325. Id. at 484, 276 N.W.2d at 626.
326. Id.
327. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974). Although the case addresses the circumstances of an army inductee required
to undergo a physical examination and not an employee, the theory of law applied in this situation is germane to the
employment environment.
328. Id. at 241.
329. Id. at 242.
330. The courts have made it clear that a medical examination undertaken by a doctor at the request of the employer
is generally deemed to be for the benefit of the employer. Therefore, no physician-patient relationship is established
between the doctor and employee. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1483; Annot., supra note 310, at 1073. When no
relationship is established between the doctor and patient under these circumstances, either no duty is owed to the
employee or a lesser duty is owed. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1483.
331. According to the testimony of Dr. Karrh, a physician employed by DuPont & Co., DuPont offers to test black
employees and black job applicants for the sickle cell trait. Dr. Karrh stated that the tests are not used for purposes of
employment, job placement, or promotion, and in fact were initiated at the request of black employees. Hearings (Oct.
1981), supra note 17, at 261.
332. Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 247 (D.D.C. 1974).
333. 47 Wash. 2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955).
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which worsened his tuberculosis. 334 Plaintiff sued his employer alleging that the
physical exertion entailed in his job aggravated his condition. The Supreme Court of
Washington found the employer liable in negligence. 335 Thus, it appears that an
employee could sue his employer if the employer allowed him to work with toxins to
which the employer knew, through genetic monitoring, the employee was hypersus-
ceptible. 336 However, it is unlikely that an employer would be held liable under such
circumstances if the employee's condition could only be ascertained through sophis-
ticated and not generally utilized techniques such as genetic screening and monitor-
ing.
3 37
If an employer uses genetic monitoring on his employees to measure the level of
exposure to dangerous toxins, the employer can be charged with negligence if he fails
to warn employees of discovered excess exposure. Thus, utilization of genetic
monitoring and a subsequent failure to notify employees of adverse results can give
rise to a cause of action for breach of the employer's common law duties to his
employees. If, however, the employer fails to warn of the danger of continued
employment to certain hypersusceptible employees, but these employees are cogni-
zant of the risk and continue to work with such knowledge, then the employer is
relieved of his duty and the employees have assumed the risk of harm. 338
Employer liability may also exist under an intentional tort theory. 339 In virtually
all jurisdictions, 340 the exclusive remedy rule is waived in the face of proof of
intentional acts by an employer to harm his employees. 341 While such proof may be
difficult for the employee to provide, the West Virginia court held that "when death
334. Id. at 681, 289 P.2d at 339.
335. Id.
336. Of course, the common law defenses-contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
rule-might serve to exculpate the employer from liability for negligence under these circumstances or in other common
law actions brought by an employee. See W. PRossER, HANBOOK OF THE LAW Or TORTS § 80, at 256 (4th ed. 1971).
337. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1484.
338. See W. PRossER, supra note 336; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1484; Note, supra note 12, at 1217. For other
suggested causes of action sounding in tort, see Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1480-84.
339. See In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. 11. 1981); Delamotte v. Unitcast Division
of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411 N.E.2d 814 (1978); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va.
695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). Justification for finding intentional torts outside workers' compensation laws is identified
in Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) where the court stated:
An intentional tort .. .is clearly not an "injury" arising out of the course of employment .... [I]t would be
a "perversion of" the Workmen's Compensation Act's purpose to allow employers immunity from intentional
torts. Indeed, it would be travesty on the use of the English language to allow someone who intentionally inflicts
an injury on another to call the injury a work incident.
Id. at 613, 433 N.E.2d at 576 n.8. However, not all courts recognize a cause of action for an intentional tort because of
the exclusive remedy rule under workers' compensation acts. In a recent California case, Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948 (1980), an employee sued his employer alleging
that the employer had known of the asbestos danger to the workers for years and had willfully concealed and intentionally
misrepresented the hazard. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950. The court denied the worker tort relief for his initial injury because
of the workers' compensation act, although it did grant him relief for the allegation that the employer had aggravated his
condition by subsequently withholding information. Id. For a discussion of this case and workers' compensation coverage
for occupational diseases, see Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy Is No Remedy At All: Workers' Compensation
Coverage for Occupational Diseases, 32 LAa. L.J. 212 (1981).
340. Contra Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948
(1980).
341. See, e.g., Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981); Jacobsen v. S.E.
Distributors, Inc., 412 So. 2d 995 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 415 So. 2d 953 (1982); Sanford v. Presto Mfg. Co., 92
N.M. 746, 594 P.2d 1202 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). See also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1484.
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or injury results from wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct such death or injury is
no longer accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and must be taken as having
been inflicted with deliberate intention.' '342 The OTA Report suggests that this ruling
supports a cause of action for genetic testing if the following conditions are met: 1)
the employer engaged in genetic screening; 2) the tests were proven predictive; 3) the
test identified the employee as hypersusceptible; 4) the employer placed the employee
in a high risk instead of a low risk environment; and 5) the employee contracted the
disease for which he was identified as being at risk.343
A more definitive intentional tort by an employer is one of fraud. For example,
if the employer engaged in genetic screening or monitoring and either hired an
employee he knew was hypersusceptible to toxins in the workplace without disclosing
the danger to him, or monitored employees without notifying them of any increased
danger to them of remaining in the toxic environment, he could be found liable for
fraudulent concealment. 344 In Delamotte v. Unitcast Division of Midland Ross
Corp.,345 an employee sued his employer for fraudulent concealment of information
concerning hazardous toxins in the work environment. In this case, the employer had
taken numerous X-rays of the plaintiff which revealed progressive and advanced
silicosis. The employer failed to disclose the results of the X-rays. Consequently, the
employee remained in the environment which was causing his health to deteriorate. 346
Once again the court held that the remedy under workers' compensation was not
exclusive, and an employee could resort to an intentional tort action for fraud when
he had been injured by the employer's conduct.347 By analogy, this cause of action
may serve as a basis for employer liability if an employee could prove that the
employer utilized genetic testing, the testing had been proven reliable, the testing
identified a particular employee as at risk, and the employer intentionally withheld the
results from the employee who subsequently contracted the occupational illness. 348
In sum, an employee has numerous possible tort actions against an employer, yet
the duties identified and liabilities outlined generally would not arise unless the
genetic tests had reached a level of reliability and validity not yet attained. Currently,
an employer is less likely to be found liable for not conducting genetic testing than
he would be for conducting such tests. This is an ironic result because the tests, to the
extent that they are reliable, can protect prospective workers from initial exposure to
harm and limit current workers from further exposure. The fact that common law
theories of liability presently act as a disincentive for employers to engage in genetic
testing raises serious concerns.
342. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 705, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
343. See REPoRT, supra note 5, at 114.
344. See Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411 N.E.2d 814 (1978). Accord
In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. 111. 1981) (employee allowed to recover for employer's
fraudulent concealment of hazardous working conditions); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa
County, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948 (1980) (recovery by employee for fraudulent concealment of his cancer). See also
Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1485.
345. 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411 N.E.2d 814 (1978).
346. Id. at 160, 411 N.E.2d at 815.
347. Id. at 162, 411 N.E.2d at 816.
348. See ReoPrr, supra note 5, at 114.
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B. Employer Liability Under OSHA
Statutory law is no clearer than the common law in delineating an employer's
obligations to his employees for genetic testing. Statutory liability for genetic testing
of employees arises not only under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, but also under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 349 There are no provisions in OSHA
specifically recommending or prohibiting the utilization of genetic screening or
monitoring, yet because the Act so directly impacts on an employee's health, OSHA
seems an appropriate focus for such practices.
Congress enacted OSHA "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human
resources. "350 In contrast to Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, the thrust of OSHA
is on minimum standards of safety rather than job preservation. Furthermore, OSHA
does not create a private right of action. 351 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
wage guarantees required of one industry by OSHA352 pursuant to its regulatory
power were beyond its jurisdiction. The Court stated that OSHA in no way authorizes
the agency "to repair general unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement
of health and safety goals." 353
OSHA places the primary onus for occupational safety and health on the
employer by requiring that the employer "furnish for each of his employees354
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. 355
This mandate to the employer is known as the general duty clause356 and is
sufficiently broad so as to encompass an obligation by an employer to engage in
genetic monitoring if such a practice would enable the employer to better gauge the
safety environment and reduce hazardous levels once recognized.
A second duty which an employer has under OSHA is to comply with all
occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor 357 for
349. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976 & Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as OSHA]. Pursuant to section 20 of OSHA, the
Secretary of HEW is authorized to conduct studies and research for developing safety and health standards. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was created for this purpose. However, although NIOSH conducts
tests and does research, only OSHA has the authority to promulgate and enforce standards under the Act. M. RomsTMN,
OccupATioNAL SAsrv Am HEALTH LAw 50 (2d ed. 1983). See also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1435.
350. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
351. See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1433.
352. In 1978 OSHA issued a Cotton Dust Standard which specified that employers provide respirators to employees.
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-1043(f) (1980). Representatives of the cotton industry brought suit challenging the validity of the
Cotton Dust Standard and the validity of the requirement pursuant to the Standard that employees unable to wear
respirators be transferred to a more dust-free position, if available, with "no loss of earnings or other employment rights
or benefits as a result of the transfer." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-1043(f)(2)(v) (1980). See American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
353. American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
354. The regulations to OSHA define an employee to includejob applicants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (1982). See
also Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1434.
355. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
356. Id.
357. Section 7(a) of OSHA charges the Secretary of Labor with the responsibility of promulgating occupational
safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Section 3(8) explains the nature of the standards
to be promulgated. It provides:
Without regard to Chapter 5 of Title 5 or to the other subsections of this section, the Secretary shall, as soon
[Vol. 46:771
1985] GENETIC TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 813
his industry. 358 Thus, the employer's obligation under OSHA is twofold.359 A closer
examination of both the extent of the employer's obligation to comply with the
standards and the extent of his duties under the general duty clause brings us closer
to identifying employer responsibilities for genetic testing under OSHA.
1. Employer Compliance With Standards
The Secretary of Labor is responsible for promulgating occupational and health
standards 360 dealing with exposure to toxic substances which "most adequately
assure, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life.' '361 Read literally, this language suggests that the Secretary of
Labor has a responsibility to promulgate standards which protect every worker despite
variances in human susceptibility. 362 Because workers do vary so greatly in their
susceptibility to toxins, "only zero exposure limits could protect all employees from
the risk of occupational disease. "363 Yet the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
Secretary may not require, nor is he obligated to require, an absolutely safe standard
of exposure for all workers. 364 Limitations on the Secretary's standard-promulgating
authority are twofold: standards must be both technologically and economically
feasible365 and, based on substantial evidence, must be "reasonably necessary or
as practicable during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two years after such
date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national consensus standard, and any
established Federal standard, unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in
improved safety or health for specifically designated employees. In the event of conflict among any such
standards, the Secretary shall promulgate the standard which assures the greatest protection of the safety or
health of the affected employees.
Id. at § 655(a).
358. OSHA standards are identified by four industrial categories: general industry, construction, maritime and
longshoring, and agriculture. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-1928 (1983). The standards mandate literal compliance. See, e.g.,
Sierra Const. Corp., 6 OSHC 1278 (1978) (use of employer's own safety methods will not serve to eliminate compliance
with OSHA).
359. The general duty clause was enacted to augment the requirement ofcomplianee with OSHA standards. If OSHA
has effected standards to cover an occupational hazard, then the employer's duty is to comply with the standard itself
before attempting his own measures to safeguard the hazard under the general duty clause. Citation of an employee under
§ 5(a)(l) of OSHA, the general duty clause, is thus improper if a specific standard exists. Brisk v. Waterproofing Co.,
I OSHC 1263 (1973).
360. Section 3(8) of OSHA defines this term to mean a standard requiring conditions or the adoption of use of
practices, means, methods, operations, or processes "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe and healthful
employment or places of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
361. Id. at § 655(b)(5). This section also provides:
Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and
such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and
safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field
of feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever
practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria, and of the performance
desired. . . . Prior to adoptions of any such standard, the Secretary must specify the health related need for such
standards.
Id. at 655(e).
362. REsoer, supra note 5, at 119.
363. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1426 (emphasis in original).
364. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); RmPoRs, upra note 5, at 120-21.
365. See United States Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913
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appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment.- 366 Thus, OSHA does not
require that standards promulgated by the Secretary eradicate work hazards entirely,
but only that they eliminate, as far as possible, significant risk of harm.367
Thus, if the Secretary promulgated a standard specifically designed to protect the
most sensitive workers, it might be challenged as not reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment 368 or because it is technolog-
ically or economically infeasible. 369 However, as noted in the OTA Report, the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of how to measure the significant risk of
harm either with respect to individuals (which would invite the use of genetic
screening in certain instances) or with respect to the work force in that industry as a
whole. 370 A suggestion, however, that elimination of significant risk of harm may be
achieved by removing hypersusceptible workers through genetic screening from the
workplace surely begs the question of the intention underlying OSHA. Identifying
those who are hypersusceptible fails to satisfy the mandate of OSHA "to assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions.' '371 The goal of OSHA is to clean up the work environment in
general, not to eliminate workers from the workplace. It would thus appear that
pursuant to the general purpose of the standards promulgated by OSHA and the
purpose of the Act itself, an employer would be unwise to engage in genetic testing
with the purpose of satisfying his obligations to comply with standards promulgated
by OSHA.
Although genetic testing in general will not satisfy the goals of the standards
promulgated by OSHA, implementation of genetic testing pursuant to specific
standards requiring employers to monitor employee exposure to specific toxins in the
workplace may be more acceptable. Congress specifically granted the Secretary
authority to promulgate standards which "prescribe the type and frequency of medical
examinations or other tests which shall be made available, by the employer or at his
cost, to employees exposed to... [toxic substances] in order to most effectively
(1980); Diversified Indus. Div., Indep. Stove Co. v. OSHRC, 618 F.2d 30, 32 (8th Cir. 1980); American Iron and Steel
Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 832 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 448 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980);
see also American Textile Mfr. Ins., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-22 (1981) (the Cotton Dust Case). Petitioners
representing the cotton industry challenged a standard promulgated by the Secretary limiting permissible exposure levels
to cotton dust. Petitioners argued the Secretary had not shown that the proposed standards were economically feasible
because he had failed to establish that the cost impact of stricter cotton dust exposure standards bore a reasonable
relationship to the project benefits to employees. The Supreme Court rejected this cost-benefit argument as being
inconsistent with the language of § 6(b)(5) and held that the term "feasible" means "capable of being done, executed
or effected." Id. at 508.
366. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the Benzene Case). In identifying
a causal link between benzene and leukemia, the Secretary had promulgated a standard limiting exposure to the lowest
technologically possible level without impairing the viability of the industries regulated. The Secretary had taken the
position that no safe exposure level could be determined and thus must, pursuant to § 6(b)(5), set the limit at its lowest
level. This standard was challenged by the industry, and the Supreme Court found the standard invalid because the
Secretary had not shown on the basis of substantial evidence that the standard "'was reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe and healthful employment' as specified by § 3(8) of OSHA." Id. at 607.
367. Id. See also Rioirr, supra note 5, at 121; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1426.
368. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1427.
369. Id.
370. REoxR, supra note 5, at 121.
371. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
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determine whether the health of such employees is adversely affected by such
exposure.' '372 Pursuant to this grant, the Secretary has created standards governing
exposure to toxic substances, one of which requires employers to monitor lead levels
among their employees. 373 Genetic monitoring could identify dangerous levels of lead
or other substances identified by regulations (such as polyvinyl chloride or arsenic)
and would appear to be within the mandate of the OSHA requirements. Arguably, if
genetic testing were sufficiently predictive to identify a group of workers at increased
risk, then OSHA might require genetic testing as part of a standard governing a
hazardous substance. 374
An analogous case is the District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision in the lead
standard case, United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall.375 This case upheld the
right of OSHA to attempt to prevent the subclinical effects of lead poisoning by the
imposition of a lead standard which required a blood-lead level examination, bio-
logical monitoring, and medical surveillance of individual workers. 376 It can be
argued that OSHA should have a similar right to attempt to prevent the ill effects of
toxic substances in workers by genetic monitoring. 377 If an employer were found to
be engaged in genetic monitoring for purposes of complying with OSHA regulations,
such testing might better pass judicial scrutiny-unless of course such practices were
deemed violative of Title VII. As at least one author has noted, the goal of providing
safe and healthful working conditions is often in conflict with the goal of providing
equal employment opportunities. 378
Although the Secretary has the authority to prescribe medical examinations for
the purpose of monitoring employee exposure levels to toxins, 379 in only a limited
number of standards380 does OSHA specify what measures employers must take based
on the results of such examinations.38 1 The few standards which do specify what
372. Id. at § 655(b)(7). Under § 6(b)(7) of OSHA, the Secretary has the power to "prescribe the type and frequency
of medical examination or other tests to determine the adverse health effects from exposure to toxic substances." REPORT,
supra note 5, at 121. The existing 21 health standards regulating toxic substances require a variety of medical procedures
including preplacement physical examinations and periodic checkups and in some instances physicals when an employee
leaves. Id. at 121-22.
373. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910-25 (1982). Other standards require the employer to monitor arsenic and acrylonitrile levels
among employees. Id. §§ 1910.1018 and 1910.1045 (1982). See Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1427. If dangerously high
levels are recorded, the employer may be required to take remedial measures such as use of personal protective equipment,
shift rotation, medical removal, or similar steps. Id.
374. REPORT, supra note 5, at 121.
375. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lead Indus. Ass'n., Inc. v. Donovan, 453 U.S. 913
(1981) (a labor union and industry challenged the lead standard promulgated by OSHA, and the court held that substantive
provisions of the lead standard, including medical removal protection program, multiple physician review program, and
rules governing access to medical records fell within the scope of OSHA's statutory power and were a reasonable exercise
of that power).
376. Id. at 1189-90.
377. See REroR, supra note 5, at 121.
378. Note, Exclusionary Employment Practices, supra note 29, at 98.
379. See supra note 372. OSHA has adopted 21 health standards regulating toxic substances, most of which require
a medical history of the exposed worker including consideration of genetic background. See REPoRT, supra note 5, at 122.
380. At least three standards, however, do provide guidance for employers. The polyvinyl chloride exposure
standard requires medical removal protection (MRP). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1017(K)(5) (1982). The asbestos standards
require MRP and rate retention (RR) if a position is available. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1001(d)(2)(iv)(c) (1982). The lead
standard also provides for both MRP and RR. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910, 1025(k) (1982).
381. REPoxT, supra note 5, at 122.
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actions employers must take (lead, vinyl chloride, and asbestos standards) identify
only two specific remedial measures: medical removal protection (MRP) and rate
retention (RR).382 If a standard requires MRP, the employer must remove an
employee from the toxic environment until the toxic level in his blood is reduced to
the required minimum or below.383 A standard requiring RR provides that the
employer must retain the employee at his current wage level during the MRP
period.384 These standards suggest that OSHA has the right to require an employer to
retain employees who have been adversely affected by toxins during their employ-
ment.
The Supreme Court challenged OSHA's authority to require MRP and RR in
American Textile Manufacturers Inst. v. Donovan385 (the Cotton Dust Case). Al-
though the Court did not directly address the question of whether OSHA has the
right to promulgate MRP and RR provisions, it did find that such requirements
could only be imposed on an employer after the Secretary has made a finding that
such provisions are necessary "to the achievement of a safe and healthful work en-
vironment." 386 The Supreme Court struck down the Secretary's RR provision in
the Cotton Dust Standard, 387 admonishing that "the Act in no way authorizes
OSHA to repair general unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement of
health and safety goals .... -388 Although the Court did invalidate the RR provi-
sions, it did not state that OSHA did not have the right to promulgate such require-
ments, but only that they be related to safety and health requirements. 389 Indeed,
the Court found that the Act's legislative history "demonstrates conclusively that
Congress was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of
compliance on industry, and believed that such costs were part of the cost of doing
business.''390 Thus, it appears that OSHA has the authority, pursuant to its power
to promulgate standards, to require genetic testing by employers to the extent tech-
nologically and economically feasible and to implement remedial measures, includ-
ing RR and MRP if justified as health related, within the work environment for
those found hypersusceptible. 391
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
386. Id. at 538; REPoRT, supra note 5, at 122; Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1430.
387. American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 541 (1981).
388. Id. at 540.
389. Id. at 541.
390. Id. at 514.
391. In a recent case out of the Ninth Circuit, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1984), an
issue similar to that in the Cotton Dust Case was decided. Plaintiffs were contesting that part of the arsenic standard which
required employers to compensate employees for their time in taking medical examinations scheduled during nonworking
hours. The Ninth Circuit, citing the Cotton Dust Case as precedent, held that such a regulation was appropriate and that
the Act fully intended to place "real and substantial costs of compliance" on industry as a cost of doing business. Id. at
1240.
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2. Employer Compliance With the General Duty Clause392
There are at least fifty-five thousand chemicals in commercial use. 393 While
OSHA has promulgated only twenty-one specific toxic standards, 394 other chemicals
are potentially covered under the general duty clause. The employer generally has a
burden to provide "each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to his employees.' ' 395 The general duty clause does not
mandate total elimination of all work hazards, but represents an achievable goal. The
employer's duty is specifically limited to recognized hazards. 396
A recognized hazard is one that is known generally by the industry in question 397
or is known to the employer in particular. 398 The hazard is then subject to both an
objective and a subjective test. 399 Because genetic monitoring can identify increases
in employer susceptibility to workplace toxins and genetic screening can initially
identify those with a low tolerance for certain workplace toxins, an employer may feel
justified in engaging in genetic testing pursuant to the general duty clause. 4° °
However, because a recognized hazard may be established subjectively, there appears
to be a disincentive for employers to voluntarily use genetic tests. Under the
subjective test, knowledge is equated with responsibility. An employer then has a
duty to eliminate the hazard, alleviate the condition for the hypersusceptible worker,
or separate the worker from the hazard. 4° 1 Alternatively, if genetic testing was an
accepted industry practice for identifying hazards in the workplace, then an employer
might be required to test and possibly be faced with the same possible options: hazard
removal, hazard stabilization, or employee removal.
Use of genetic screening is not fulfilling the employer's obligation under OSHA
because the employer is focusing on the worker (who, if hypersusceptible, can do
nothing to modify his gene structure) as opposed to the workplace (which the
employer under OSHA has an obligation to keep clean). 402 Because the exclusion of
392. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
393. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 1 (testimony of Chairman Albert Gore).
394. REPoRT, supra note 5, at 121.
395. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
396. Id.
397. National Realty & Constr. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (a hazard recognized by
industry is one which is identifiable by the "common knowledge of safety experts who are familiar with the circumstances
of the industry or the activity in question." Id. at 1265 n.32. Accord Beaird-Poulan, 7 OSHC 1225 (1979). See also M.
RoTms , supra note 349, at 166.
398. A hazard recognized by an individual employer is one known to the employer through personal knowledge.
Brennan v. OSHRC, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974). Accord General Electric Co., 100 OSHC 2034 (1982). While
knowledge of a recognized hazard under § 5(a)(1) refers to knowledge that a condition is hazardous, under § 5(a)(2)
employer knowledge refers to knowledge that a condition exists. See M. RoTisRIN, supra note 349, at 107.
399. See M. RonmsE, supra note 349, at 166.
400. OSHA does not specifically address the issue of genetic testing, and an employee could not therefore interpret
it to mandate such practices. REPORT, supra note 5, at 120.
401. Since we are addressing the employer's duty under the general duty clause and not under specific standards,
it is not easy to identify exactly what his or her duties would be when confronted with recognized hazards. Generally,
OSHA would require engineering controls and protective equipment as remedial measures. Removal and rate retention are
not mandated by the general duty clause. Because OSHA is not a job security act but a "workplace clean up" act, it does
not protect workers from discharge for hypersusceptibility.
402. Note, supra note 12, at 1209.
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hypersusceptible workers does nothing to free the workplace from recognized haz-
ards, it is doubtful that an employer can defend the practice under the guise of the
general duty clause. Furthermore, officials of OSHA have gone on record stating that
the agency is opposed to the practice of genetic testing.40 3
A recent case involving the employer's obligations under the general duty clause
raises some interesting questions about the employer's right to use genetic testing to
remove those workers found to be hypersusceptible from the toxic workplace. In 1979
OSHA issued a citation to the American Cyanamid Company alleging that it had
violated the general duty clause by adopting a fetal protection policy. The policy
excluded women age sixteen to fifty from production jobs dealing with lead unless the
women could prove that they had been sterilized. 4° 4 The citation was based on the
theory that such a program constituted a hazard under the general duty clause and that
implementation of such a policy violated the employer's duty to safeguard employees
from recognized hazards. The case was heard by an administrative law judge who
ruled in the company's favor.405 On appeal, a three-person review commission ruled,
in a split decision, that the citation be dismissed. 406 The basis for dismissal was that,
although the scope of the general duty clause was intended to protect employees from
reduced functional capacity as a result of the work experience, it did not extend to an
employment policy "whose physical impact on employees is indirect and derives not
from work processes and materials but from social and economic factors outside the
workplace.' '407 In dismissing the argument that the fetal protection policy represented
a workplace hazard, the review commission stated:
The fetus protection policy ... is neither a work process nor a work material, and it
manifestly cannot alter the physical integrity of employees while they are engaged in work
or work-related activities. An employee's decision to undergo sterilization in order to gain
or retain employment grows out of economic and social factors which operate primarily
outside the workplace. The employer neither controls nor creates these factors as he
creates or controls work processes and materials. For these reasons, we conclude that the
policy is not a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause. 4O8
The commission's decision suggests that employer utilization of genetic testing would
not violate the general duty clause because such a policy, like the fetal protection
policy, is neither a work process nor a work material.40 9
403. Bingham, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1980, at 20, col. 5 (statement by then Assistant Secretary
of Occupational Safety and Health that OSHA does not approve of genetic screening and that such practices run counter
to the intent of OSHA).
404. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid, 9 OSHC 1596, 1597 (1981), affd, 671
F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982).
405. Id. at 1597.
406. Id. at 1601.
407. Id. at 1600.
408. Id. Although OSHA did not appeal the decision, the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers Union did. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the Review Commission's decision. Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982).
409. Congress conceived of occupational hazards in terms of processes and materials which cause injury or disease
by operating directly upon employees as they engage in work or work-related activities. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Int'l v. American Cyanamid, 9 OSHC 1596, 1600 (1981) affd, 671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
905 (1982).
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There is an important tangential question raised by this case: if, as in the
Cyanamid case, a standard set by OSHA is underinclusive and recognized to be so, 410
may an employer in the face of technological nonfeasibility (the workplace cannot be
made safer) use his own methods to ensure worker safety to effect the goals of OSHA
even if it means excluding certain employees (the hypersusceptible) from the work-
place? The Cyanamid case appears to suggest that an employer may have license to
do this. Once again, however, the stumbling block is the context in which the decision
was made. In the Cyanamid case, the concern was for the fetus, a third party, as in
Wright v. Olin Corp.4t t The issue of third party protection did not arise explicitly in
the Cyanamid case as it did in the Wright case. Arguably, such concern is outside the
scope of OSHA. By analogy, however, if the fetal protection policy was not subject
to the general duty clause, then neither would a genetic testing policy unless it could
be proven that such a policy was used in substitution for reasonable safeguarding of
the workplace against recognized hazards.
The duty under OSHA is to safeguard employees from recognized hazards. If
neither the standards set by OSHA nor the technology of the day make it feasible for
an employer to achieve this goal and still continue his business using the necessary
toxins, arguably he could be allowed to protect workers by genetic selection. In so
doing, he would be fulfilling the requirements of OSHA. In light of the Cyanamid
decision, a legitimate argument exists for utilizing genetic testing to effect the goals
of OSHA and the general duty clause in particular when there are no feasible
alternatives.
V. LEGAL SUMMARY AND SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS
Prior to suggesting a legislative proposal for the regulation of genetic testing, it
is important to briefly summarize the legal problems and review the social and ethical
problems currently facing the practice of genetic testing. As the preceding survey of
the law has suggested, there are serious legal concerns for both the employer and the
employee surrounding the practice of genetic testing of workers. Although the
government survey found only a handful of companies currently engaged in genetic
testing, a greater number expressed interest in commencing such practices in the
future. 412 Because of the very real health benefits to be derived from the screening and
monitoring of workers, predictions have been made that these practices will be more
commonplace in the future. 413
410. Although OSHA has created standards limiting the levels of lead to which an employee may be exposed, OSHA
warned in the preamble to such regulations that they would not protect a fetus from possible overexposure. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1910, 1025(k) (1981).
411. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
412. Three hundred sixty-six companies out of the five hundred responded. Of these, 59 acknowledged they would
possibly use the tests within the next five years. RsoRr, supra note 5, at 34.
413. See Diamond, supra note 12, at 231 n.l ("Growing acceptance of genetic testing in non-employment situations
will likely lead to an increased acceptance of the procedure in employment-related screening, as the procedure is similar.").
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Particular employee concerns which have been reviewed in this Article include
the utilization of genetic testing for discriminatory purposes414 and intrusive employer
practices which violate employee privacy. 415 Although Title VII, the Rehabilitation
Act, and state antidiscriminatory statutes were devised to protect employees from
discriminatory employer policies or actions, the use of genetic testing by employers
was not one of the concerns envisioned by the drafters of this legislation. Conse-
quently, genetic testing does not satisfactorily fit into the prohibitions of these statutes
or fall within the congressional intent underlying these statutes.
Reviewing the analysis of Title VII, denial of employment on the basis of a
genetic test may give rise to a cause of action for discrimination based on race or
national origin. 416 Because genetic traits vary among ethnic populations, a genetic
screening and exclusion practice could have a disparate impact on a protected class.
To defend such a policy, an employer would have to prove the business necessity and
job relatedness of such practices. 417 It is not clear, however, that avoidance of tort
liability, a reduction in workers' compensation claims, or a reduction in the cost of
engineering controls would constitute a business necessity. It is also not clear whether
an employee's capacity to perform the job without risk of future illness is ajob-related
characteristic. 418 If an employer were unable to defend a genetic screening program
and the program proved to have a disparate impact on a protected class, such a policy
would violate Title VII based on these criteria.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is another piece of antidiscriminatory legislation
which may be used by an employee subjected to a genetic test and resultant
discrimination. 4 19 Once again, an employee pursuing protection under this Act may
succeed. The employer is required to take affirmative action to employ and promote
qualified handicapped individuals. 420 However, if the employer's job qualification
requirements tend to screen out qualified handicapped individuals, then the require-
ments must be related to the specific job or jobs for which the individual is being
considered and must be consistent with business necessity and the safe performance
of the job.421 The statute offers no help in determining whether a person is handi-
capped because of his genetic make-up or whether an applicant could be denied
employment because of a potential future occupational illness. However, the case law
suggests there is a strong argument for finding that genetic make-up is a disability,
thus making exclusion of employees on that basis a possible violation of the Act. 422
An employee whose employer did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of
either Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act might not fare so well under state antidis-
414. See supra notes 81-253 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 254-89 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 87-122 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 123-40 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 169-224 and accompanying text.
420. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
421. See supra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.
422. See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980); supra notes 187-202 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 46:771
GENETIC TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE
crimination laws. 423 While some states apply a broad definition of the term "handi-
capped" including perceived sensitivity to injury in the future, 424 others define a
handicap more narrowly requiring a substantial physical impairment verified by
medical findings and likely to continue throughout the individual's life. 42 5 However,
some states limit the use of genetic testing. Three states specifically prohibit exclusion
of workers from the workplace on the basis of the sickle cell trait,426 and one state
prohibits employee screening on the basis of hereditary traits in general. 427
Other concerns of the employee--dissemination of test results, the right to be
told of the test results, and the right to be informed of experimental uses of such
tests428-are neither addressed by the Constitution nor by common law. In general,
absent limited statutory prohibitions, 429 no restrictions exist regarding employer
requirements of preemployment blood tests, the use of any blood tests for job
placement purposes, 430 or the dissemination of test results. Furthermore, although the
common law physician-patient privilege requires confidentiality of information given
by the patient to the physician, this privilege generally does not extend to the company
physician and employee or job applicant relationship. 431 However, pursuant to both
right to know statutes432 and the common law duty of employers433 to employees, a
worker does have a right to be told of toxic substances in his workplace. However,
these right to know laws do not require that the employer take any preventive
measures to protect employees.
Employee concern with genetic testing focuses on the employer's duties to
employees under the common law for such practices434 and compliance with OSHA
regulations, 435 specifically the general duty clause.436 First, an employer may be
found liable in tort on a number of different theories relating to genetic testing.437
Under the theory of negligence, an employer can be liable for the breach of various
statutory duties owed the employee. These breaches include failing to act upon
knowledge gained from genetic testing or failing to obtain correct results due to
negligent administration of the tests. Another theory of liability for genetic testing is
based on fraud. If an employer knows of an employee's hypersusceptibility to a
certain toxin yet allows him to work anyway, the employer can be liable for
fraudulently withholding the information.
423. See supra notes 225-53 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 254-89 and accompanying text.
429. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides that an employer may not discriminate against an employee orjob applicant
"because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title." 42 U.S.C. 2001(a) (1976
& Supp. 1979). A blood test used for unlawful purposes is thus arguably prohibited.
430. Id.
431. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
433. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 297-348 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 360-91 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 392-411 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 297-348 and accompanying text.
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Second, OSHA requires an employer "to provide each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm."438 The employer
is further required to "comply with occupational safety and health standards pro-
mulgated under this Act." 439 In promulgating exposure standards, the Supreme Court
held in the Benzene Case that a standard must be "reasonably necessary or appro-
priate to remedy a significant risk of material health impairment" 440 and that OSHA
does not require the Secretary to promulgate standards that would assure an absolutely
risk-free workplace. 441 Although certain OSHA standards require medical surveil-
lance of employees and others require specific medical tests,442 genetic testing is
neither mandated nor prohibited. Also, OSHA places responsibility for the safety and
health of employees on the employer, but it does not mandate the requirement of a
risk-free workplace. 443 Further, although OSHA neither sanctions nor condemns the
use of genetic testing, it is unclear whether such tests could be used by employers to
comply with OSHA regulations concerning testing or the general duty clause. Absent
such a sanction, an employer is subject to accusations that testing violates his duty to
maintain a clean work environment because he is weeding out susceptible workers
instead of the hazard.
The potential liabilities of an employer contemplating the use of genetic testing
and the potential abuses of employee rights resulting from this testing are awesome.
Because of the importance of such practices, the employer should not be left to his
own devices but should be subject to statutory regulation in regard to the use of
genetic testing of workers.
Not only are the duties of the employer and the rights of the employee with
regard to genetic testing unclear, but similar confusion abounds as to the social and
ethical application of such practices. On the one hand, proponents of genetic testing
identify validated tests as a legitimate practice furthering the general health surveil-
lance effort and protecting the well-being of employees. As one proponent has stated,
there are three legitimate goals of genetic testing: "to protect the worker; to support
the regulatory process that's required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act; and
to reduce the employer's liability." 4 " Another proponent of genetic testing suggests
that validated genetic screening should be used pursuant to a cost-benefit analysis:
[he degree of control that would have to be achieved may be unattainable by available
engineering measures or be prohibitively costly. If the costs are excessive and impinge
seriously on the financial health of the enterprise, the benefit to a few could be outweighed
by the harm to the majority of workers and it might be better to place hypersusceptible
workers elsewhere. 45
438. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
439. Id. § 654(a)(2).
440. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980).
441. Id.
442. See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
443. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
444. Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17, at 142 (testimony of Dr. G. Omenn).
445. Id. at 9 (testimony of Dr. Ernest E. Dixon).
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Yet another proponent of genetic screening believes that the health protection
potential of the process overrides possible discriminatory effects:
[S]creening procedures for hypersusceptible workers are interpreted by some as contrary
to the requirements for equal employment opportunity and nondiscrimination, and used
against the interests of workers. I believe that there are two competing social priorities in
this case-the protection of the health and safety versus equal opportunity employment.
In my opinion, prudence would dictate that safety and health concerns take priority. 446
The major concern of opponents to genetic testing is that tests will be used as a
substitute for improving the workplace. 447 The opponents argue that genetic screening
shifts the responsibility from the shoulders of the employer to those of the worker. 48
Further concern is voiced that such practices are discriminatory because of the
occurrence of particular genetic traits among particular subcategories of workers. One
opponent argues that exposure levels should protect even the most susceptible
workers and expressed concern that genetic screening would transfer responsibility
"to the genetics of the worker, thus deflecting the attention that might be paid to the
employer's ability or unwillingness to make the workplace safe for all those who trust
that their health will be protected on the job."449 Another opponent is concerned that
such testing could be used to discriminate:
The day is rapidly approaching when possessing a piece of a subject's skin would provide
an unscrupulous individual with far more detailed information about that subject than
could be obtained from a fingerprint and a high quality photograph. If we know enough
about a person's genetic profile, we could exclude him or her from almost any job.450
The strongest opposition to genetic testing during the government's hearings was
raised by Mr. Samuels, the director of Health, Safety and the Environment of the'
AFL-CIO. He stated:
Genetic screening has a potential for unjust application and shortsighted social policy. The
probability of overreacting that would unfairly reduce employment opportunities for
thousands-perhaps millions-of men and women is established by past performance.
Normal "marketplace" corporate policies would discard human beings (correctly or
incorrectly from a biological perspective) on a scrap heap for the impoverished.... Can
we and should we create a race of "susceptibles" consciously sacrificed on the alter of
the "greatest good for the greatest number"? ... Who would employ these "suscept-
ibles," who would protect their dignity and place in the community? Here is the stuff by
which war and revolution have been made and by which human progress has been
destroyed .... Yet, reliable genetic screening should be done-on one condition:
Industrial genetic screening should only take place in a society that has created a system
of screening within neutral community structures that protect the individual and his family
during the counseling process. It must not take place in the coercive milieu of the typical
industrial setting. Acceptable patient-physician relationships cannot usually be developed
446. Mastromatteo, On the Concept of Threshold, 42 Am. INDus. HYGMaN AJ. 763, 768 (1981).
447. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
448. Id.
449. Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 51 (testimony of Dr. K. Miller).
450. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 68 (testimony of Dr. H. Sloan).
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
and maintained in a setting in which confidentiality and trust between doctor and the
worker is secondary to interests of the corporation.
451
Ethical issues concerning the use of genetic testing in the workplace were
identified during the congressional hearings by Dr. Murray, an associate for social
and behavioral studies. 452 Dr. Murray noted that the ethical questions are obscured by
the fact that the testing's focal point is a person's genes which are fixed, unchangable,
and unchosen.453 The issue is confused further because genes are inherited along
racial or ethnic lines thereby raising the spectre of racial discrimination. 454 As Dr.
Murray stated in the hearings:
The lesson of this is not, I think, that genetic testing is therefore undemocratic or morally
wrong. I can imagine circumstances where it would be politically irresponsible and morally
corrupt not to act on our knowledge of genetic differences. But facts about genetic make-ups
and predispositions are just that-facts-and we would be fools to ignore them.455
Dr. Murray identified four possible uses of genetic testing in the workplace, only
the last of which he sees as creating serious ethical issues: clinical diagnosis, research,
information gathering, and exclusion. 456 Regarding this last use of genetic testing,
Dr. Murray expressed concern that it is "not obvious that exclusion from jobs is the
best social policy or the most moral action." 457 In confronting the issue of genetic
testing in the workplace, Dr. Murray summarized the social and moral choices which
society faces as being "how to protect the interest of society and the health of the
workers without unduly interfering with personal liberty and while preserving a good
measure of social justice.'"458
VI. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
A. The Need for Legislation
Although scientists caution that genetic testing is still in the embryonic stages of
research, 459 it is nevertheless being used today by employers to identify employees at
greater risk to toxins.460 There is strong evidence that more employers plan to engage
in genetic testing in the future. 461 Because of the serious possibility of misuse of the
practice462 and because certain tests are of significant benefit as indicators of potential
451. Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17, at 32 (testimony of S. Samuels).
452. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 75 (testimony of Thomas Murray); Murray, supra note 11, at 5. Dr.
Murray suggests that the moral issues involved in genetic testing of workers are more complicated than the simple analysis
of autonomy versus paternalism because such a perspective ignores the existence of a power relationship between the
employer and his employees. Id. For further discussion on the autonomy issue surrounding the right to genetically screen
workers from the workplace, see McGarity & Schroeder, supra note 12, at 1025-29.
453. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 76.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. For a detailed analysis of these four applications of genetic testing, see Murray, supra note 11, at 6-7.
457. Murray, supra note 11, at 7.
458. Id. at 8.
459. See generally Hearings (Oct. 1981), supra note 17; Sheridan, Genetic Screening: Its Promise and Peril, supra
note 11.
460. See REPoRT, supra note 5, at 34.
461. Id.
462. Z. HAessim & R. HurrON, supra note 4, at 118. See also Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 107.
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serious illness to employees exposed to toxins in the workplace, 463 this author
recommends that Congress act now to regulate the practice. If employers are allowed
to experiment with genetic tests regardless of their validity without legislative
guidelines, lawsuits will undoubtedly be the result. Lawsuits may arise pursuant to
Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, OSHA, or state antidiscrimination laws. A number
of confusing legal issues could arise under Title VII including the interpretation of
genetic make-up as a bfoq464 and the use of business necessity as a defense to refusal
to hire. 465 Under the Rehabilitation Act, the issue would focus on the nature of genetic
make-up; does it represent a handicap? 466 Under OSHA, a further issue would arise:
is genetic testing appropriate in light of the Act's avowed purpose-to maintain a safe
workplace for all men and women?467 At the state level, a myriad of conflicting
decisions would arise concerning the definition of genetic make-up as a handicap. 468
Allowing states to decide the issue separately would prove problematic by affecting
an employer's decision concerning the location of his business. Conversely, state
regulation might affect a worker's decision concerning where he will live and work.
In general, our current legal framework appears ill equipped to address the issues
raised by genetic testing in the employment setting. The practice of genetic testing
falls under the jurisdiction of three federal statutes whose goals are contradictory. It
is very possible that genetic testing would be prohibited under Title VII because an
employer is unable to defend practices which clearly have unequal racial results and
because cost savings are not considered a rationale for the business necessity defense.
However, it is possible that OSHA would encourage such practices in the interest of
enhancing employee health if there were no alternative means available to better
effectuate improved safety in the workplace. Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act, state
laws, and the legal definition of handicapped individual, might protect the employee's
job on the basis that he was currently able to perform the work. Thus, the Rehabil-
itation Act would protect an employee's right to a job in a manner inconsistent with
OSHA. Furthermore, under common law the employer has no duty to inform current
or prospective employees of test results, to limit dissemination of the test results, or
to maintain that the tests are voluntary. Because of the confusion the use of genetic
tests would currently generate, and because of the lack of clear statutory or common
law protections for the employee surrounding these tests, Congress should define the
rights, obligations, and liabilities of the parties engaged in genetic testing.
In designing such legislation, careful thought should be given to the issues and
concerns faced by the employee and the employer under our current legal framework.
First, legislation for genetic testing should be responsive to employee concerns of
discrimination and confidentiality and to employer concerns of common law and
statutory liability to the employee. Second, legislation should be sensitive to the goals
sought by the use of genetic testing in the workplace.
463. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 101-112 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 349-411 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 225-53 and accompanying text.
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These goals have been aptly identified by a witness at the government's hearings:
clinical diagnosis, research, information, and exclusion. 469 First, the tests could be
used to clinically diagnose toxic illness in a worker; second, tests could be used in
research to identify causal relations between a worker's genetic make-up and reac-
tions to toxins in the workplace; third, the information gleaned from genetic tests
could be used to inform workers of any links between their genetic make-up and
certain work environments; and fourth, the tests could be-used to exclude certain
workers from toxic work environments to which they exhibited a hypersusceptibil-
ity. 470 The first three uses clearly serve to benefit society by expanding our knowledge
of genetic anomalies and their relation to the workplace. Through this knowledge,
lives can be saved. However, the fourth application-exclusion-raises serious
ethical and moral questions concerning employer and employee rights and requires
careful regulation by the government to forestall abuse by employers.
It is proposed that the overall goal of legislation should be to validate the
utilization of genetic testing for purposes of reducing worker illness or death from
occupational disease. Regulation should specify those tests which have probative
value for identified occupational disease hazards. The legislation should regulate
closely the uses of genetic tests and address the responsibilities of the employer to his
employee in connection with the test results. The following proposed statute, while
not comprehensive, 47 1 is intended to provide a starting point for the drafting of
legislation to regulate the use of genetic testing in the workplace.
B. A Brief Summary of the Act
The proposed legislation is suggested to effect the validation and regulation of
genetic tests in the workplace for the specific purposes of clinical diagnosis, research,
information, and limited exclusion of workers. To carry out these purposes, the Act
will create a Commission on Genetic Testing comprised of three members: one from
industry, one from labor, and one from the scientific community. The Commission
shall have four functions: 1) the promulgation of rules and regulations surrounding the
practice of genetic testing in the workplace; 2) the review of complaints in regard to
discriminatory application of the tests or other violations of this Act; 3) the distri-
bution of grants for the study of genetic tests; and 4) the review of genetic tests
proposed by industry and the submission of selective tests to the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for approval.
NIOSH has the responsibility of determining the validity of all tests as probative
of certain occupational disease hazards and to either approve the test for use in
appropriate industries, disapprove the test, or hold the test for further study. Approved
tests which are appropriate to an employer's industry may be used by employers for
genetic screening and must be used for genetic monitoring purposes. If through
469. See Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 76 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Murray). See also Murray, supra
note 11.
470. See Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 76 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Murray).
471. The author's concern in drafting this proposed legislation was to identify the major provisions. The majority
of the legislation is left to those more familiar with legislative drafting.
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genetic screening an employer determines that a prospective employee is hypersus-
ceptible (his tolerance for a given toxin falls below the level identified as safe by
NIOSH), an employer may refuse to hire him. If through genetic monitoring an
employer determines that an employee has become hypersusceptible, the employer
must accommodate that employee by alternative means. Employer options may
include, to the extent economically and technologically feasible, protective equip-
ment, rotation, or permanent displacement to a nontoxic job with any necessary
retraining. If NIOSH disapproves a genetic test for having no or little probative value,
an employer may not use the test for purpose of employment decisions. If NIOSH
mandates further study of a genetic test, or if a test has not yet been studied by
NIOSH, an employer may use the test. However, an employer may not refuse to hire
a prospective employee on the basis of this test and must substantially accommodate
a current employee who is determined hypersusceptible.
When utilizing either genetic screening or monitoring, the employer has a duty
to inform the employee of the purpose and results of the test. The employer is further
required to keep all test results confidential. Sanctions provided are for employer
violations of the Act or its regulations and discriminatory application of test results.
The Act further establishes an employee private right of action in federal courts.
C. The Proposed Statute
The text of the proposed statute and comments thereto follow.
Section 1
Statement of Findings and Declaration of Purpose and Policy
(a) This Act may be cited as "the 1985 Act for the Regulation of Genetic Testing in the
Workplace."
(b) Congress finds that:
(1) Many toxic substances and harmful chemical agents are in wide use throughout
industry in the United States.
(2) A significant number of workers suffer disability or death or both from occupa-
tional diseases caused by exposure to toxins or chemical agents in the workplace.
(3) Exposure to toxins or chemical agents is increasing at a rapid rate as scientific
technology provides industry with more toxins and chemicals to enhance produc-
tion and the discovery of new products.
(4) Exposure poses a danger to certain employees and places a substantial burden on
the national economy due to losses in production, workdays, earnings, and
increased medical expenses and disability payments.
(5) The science of genetic engineering is now able to identify an individual's genetic
composition on the basis of a blood test.
(6) Genetic tests of high probative value have a signficant application in the work-
place by identifying prospective employees susceptible to toxins through genetic
screening and by identifying employee intolerance to present levels of toxins
through genetic monitoring.
(7) A rational approach to the regulation of genetic testing in the workplace will
advance the four goals of the use of such tests: clinical diagnosis, research,
information dissemination, and exclusion, while also protecting the interests and
rights of employees.
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(c) The purpose and policy of Congress pursuant to this Act and through the exercise of
its power to regulate interstate commerce, commerce with foreign nations, and to
provide for general welfare, is to promote the use of genetic testing as a means of
protecting the health of working men and women, reducing incidence of serious
illnesses derived from exposure to toxins in the workplace, and reducing the costs
associated with occupational illness for employers, prospective and current employ-
ees, and society. This purpose and policy will be effectuated by:
(1) establishing a Commission on Genetic Testing within the Department of Labor
authorized to establish mandatory standards concerning the use of genetic tests;
(2) providing for approval of genetic tests by the Commission and the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; and
(3) defining and proscribing various practices of the employer in the administration
and use of genetic tests for the purposes of clinical diagnosis, research, informa-
tion dissemination, and exclusion of workers on a lawful basis.
Based on the OTA Report, substantial evidence indicates that certain genetic
tests have probative value and that genetic testing can be a valuable tool in curtailing
occupational illnesses through diagnosis, research, information dissemination, and
exclusion. It is deemed advisable and necessary to consider legislation to preempt the
misuse of genetic testing and to encourage testing in furtherance of employee health
goals.
In light of the avowed purpose of this legislation, amendment of any one of the
pieces of legislation already discussed (Title VII, OSHA, the Rehabilitation Act) is
not satisfactory. The purpose of Title VII is to protect certain classes of persons from
discrimination472 and is therefore too narrow in scope to encompass genetic testing.
OSHA, pursuant to its regulatory power, could regulate the use of genetic testing;
however, OSHA's mandate is not job protection (which would be part of genetic
testing legislation) but regulation of work hazards.473 Thus, OSHA would lack
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Furthermore, OSHA does not provide either a
private cause of action to employees or satisfactory remedies. 474 The definition of
handicapped475 under the Rehabilitation Act could be modified to include those who
are genetically predisposed to certain toxins, yet once again our interest in regulating
the use of genetic testing is much broader than simply protecting the worker in his job.
Furthermore, the Act's jurisdiction is limited to those who receive federal funds. 476
While it is acknowledged that any one of the foregoing acts could be amended in some
fashion to encompass genetic testing, this author rejects this approach. The amend-
ment of any of these acts would be unsatisfactory because their orientations and
original purposes are not sufficiently comprehensive to deal with the scope of
concerns involved with genetic testing. Thus, there is a need for a new and
independent piece of legislation.
472. See supra note 89.
473. See supra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 351.
475. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. See also Sanchez, supra note 12 (suggestion that the Rehabilitation
Act currently provides for protection and relief of the hypersusceptible).
476. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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Section 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Act
(a) "Commission" means the Commission on Genetic Testing established under this
chapter or its regional directors acting on its behalf.
(b) "Employee" means any employee of an employer whose business affects commerce
or any applicant for employment.
(c) "Genetic monitoring" means the routine testing by an employer of employees who
regularly work with toxins to detect any changes in genetic make-up of the exposed
employee and to determine whether hypersusceptibility has been attained.
(d) "Genetic screening" means a one time preemployment testing procedure used to
identify ajob applicant's genetic make-up and to determine his hypersusceptibility to
toxins in the workplace.
(e) "Genetic testing" shall include both genetic monitoring and genetic screening.
(f) "Hypersusceptibility" refers to those individuals whose tolerance for a given toxin,
pursuant to an approved genetic test, falls below the level identified as safe by NIOSH,
or as otherwise defined by NIOSH for a given genetic test.
(g) "Institute" (or "NIOSH") refers to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health established pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title 29 of the United States Code
entitled Occupational Safety and Health.
(h) "Secretary" refers to the Secretary of Labor.
(i) "Toxins" refers to radiation and to poisonous, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic,
or other harmful substances in the workplace to which exposure causes a risk of serious
or fatal illness as determined by the Commission pursuant to its regulatory power.
A number of terms in the Act need to be defined clearly in order that an employer
understands his responsibilities and an employee recognizes his rights.
The Commission is granted various regulatory, reviewing, and enforcement
powers. The duties of the Commission necessitate more authority than the EEOC
under Title VII. No comparable body under the Rehabilitation Act or OSHA exists.
The term "employee" has been specifically defined to include job applicants as
well as current employees. This definition is critically important because of the practice
of genetic screening which is directed solely to prospective employees and not current
employees. Also, this specific definition avoids questions ofjudicial interpretation. 477
Of equal importance are the definitions of genetic screening and genetic mon-
itoring which are treated separately under the Act and which represent separate utility
to both scientists and industry.
It is important to identify those employees who are at a measure of risk to their
health which is unacceptable to the industry and society. The term "hypersusceptibil-
ity" has been chosen to identify these employees. As outlined in the Act, NIOSH has
the responsibility for determining the level of toxicity for each approved genetic test
which represents an unacceptable elevation triggering various actions under the Act.
Toxins must also be defined to identify those chemicals or other harmful
substances for which NIOSH has approved tests, disapproved tests, or established that
determinations are pending.
477. Such a problem of interpretation arose under The National Labor Relations Act and had to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
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Section 3
Establishment of a Commission on Genetic Testing
(a) There is established a Commission on Genetic Testing within the Department of
Labor.
(b) The Commission shall be composed of three commissioners, appointed by the
President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, each
to serve four-year terms.
(c) The Commission shall appoint regional directors for the enforcement of this Act.
(d) There shall be a General Counsel of the Commission appointed by the President by
and with the advise and consent of the Senate for a term of four years. The General
Counsel shall have responsibility for the conduct of litigation as provided in section
10. The General Counsel shall have other duties as the Commission directs.
As at least one author has noted, if legislation is to be enacted to regulate the use
of genetic testing, it is important to establish "a mechanism for rule making to
evaluate the state of the art in medical screening and to promulgate necessary
regulations.' '478 Although several authors have suggested that genetic testing could be
regulated under Title VII,479 a serious drawback is the lack of rule making power of
its Commission, the EEOC. The powers of the EEOC are limited to furnishing
assistance to persons subject to Title VII, attempting to effect conciliation between
employer and employee, making technical studies, and intervening in civil actions
brought under section 706.480 The EEOC lacks the authority, which the Commission
under this Act needs, to promulgate regulations concerning the use of genetic tests.
Furthermore, the focus of Title VII is on job preservation and not employee
health. While job preservation is indeed a component of this Act, it is only one of its
purposes. The other purposes of this Act include the authorization of genetic tests,
medical review of and probative value determination of such tests, the encouragement
of research of other genetic tests, and the watch-dogging of employer conduct in
regard to these tests. The jurisdiction of Title VII or the EEOC simply is not
sufficiently broad to encompass the scope of genetic testing.
Similarly, another author has proposed that an amendment to OSHA would be
appropriate, thereby granting the Occupational Safety and Health Commission juris-
diction over genetic tests. 481 Whether or not this approach has some merit, this author
believes that the subject matter of genetic testing deserves a separate commission
designed to address its particular needs. OSHA was designed to oversee the work-
place and the safety of workers. To this extent, OSHA satisfactorily meshes with the
concern of genetic testing of promoting worker safety. However, the OSHA Com-
mission only has the power to promulgate rules concerning safety measures in the
workplace and does not address the issue of preclusion of workers from the workplace
or the tangential issue of job preservation. Because OSHA lacks the jurisdiction to
478. Rothstein, supra note 12, at 1495-96 n.751.
479. See Rothstein, supra note 12; Note, supra note 12.
480. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-el7 (1976 & Supp. 1979). For the limited powers
of the EEOC, see § 705 of Title VII.
481. See Sanchez, supra note 12, at 201.
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deal with these issues, it is recommended that a separate commission be established
to specifically address this important employment tool.
Finally, one author has recommended that the Rehabilitation Act be revised to
subsume the category of hypersusceptible employees under the definition of handi-
capped. 482 The Rehabilitation Act's purpose is to require employers to take affirma-
tive action to hire the handicapped. However, this author again feels the scope of the
Rehabilitation Act is too narrow. While the Rehabilitation Act deals with job
preservation, Congress did not intend to require employers to hire someone and
expose them to a work environment which is harmful simply because they satsifac-
torily meet the definition of handicapped. Indeed, such a solution would contravene
current common law duties of the employer such as not knowingly exposing an
employee to a dangerous condition.483 Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act has no
rule making body or power, both of which are essential to properly address the
concerns identified by both employers and employees regarding genetic testing.
It is recommended that the Commission be comprised of a member from each of
three interest groups: industry, labor, and science. Because of the competing interests
of industry (cost savings associated with exclusionary practices) and labor (job
preservation and nondiscrimination), each group should have a representative on the
Commission to reflect and advocate their disparate interests. The Commission also
should have a representative from the scientific community who is in the best position
to address the technological nuances of genetic engineering, a rapidly evolving field.
The composition of the Commission hopefully will lead to regulations concerning
genetic testing which are compatible with the respective concerns of each interest
group.
It is recommended that a general counsel be appointed to oversee the legal
administration of the Act. This position is patterned after the equivalent position under
Title VII.
Section 4
Powers and Duties of the Commission; NIOSH Duties
(a) The Commission shall have authority to promulgate rules and regulations regarding:
(1) factors NIOSH shall consider in determining the probity of a genetic test,
including but not limited to validity, reliability, severity of harm the test is
designed to detect, predictability, and avoidability of harm;
(2) testing procedures, including but not limited to which employees may be sub-
jected to a given genetic test, the contents of consent forms, and the contents of
a statement informing the employee he has been diagnosed as hypersusceptible;
(3) a standard concerning the use of genetic tests for purposes of screening or
monitoring in the workplace.
(b) Proposed rules and regulations shall be promulgated by:
(1) publication in the Federal Register with an allowance of thirty days after publi-
cation for comments from interested parties;
482. See Sanchez, supra note 12.
483. See supra notes 297-348 and accompanying text.
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(2) publication of any amendments to a proposed rule or regulation in the Federal
Register, again allowing thirty days for comments;
(3) publication of the final rule or regulation in the Federal Register.
(c) Upon publication of a final rule or regulation, the rule shall become effective twenty
days after publication.
(d) During the twenty days between publication of a final rule or regulation and the date
it becomes effective, the Secretary shall have authority to revoke the proposed rule or
regulation or to issue a delay order to postpone its effective date.
(e) The Commission shall have authority to submit proposed genetic tests to NIOSH for
NIOSH's approval. In determining whether to submit a proposed genetic test to
NIOSH, the Commission shall determine whether a substantial number of employees
may be protected from a predictable harm if the test is found valid and approved by
NIOSH.
(f) Upon receiving a proposed genetic test, NIOSH shall determine the validity of the test
considering such factors as potential harm, predictability of potential harm, reliability,
and other factors as promulgated by the Commission in its rules and regulations.
NIOSH shall tender one of the following determinations:
(1) approval of the proposed test as valid;
(2) disapproval of the proposed test as invalid;
(3) neither approval nor disapproval of the test, but a determination that the proposed
test's validity is uncertain pending further study.
(g) The Commission shall have the authority to review complaints by an employee
alleging a violation by his employer of any applicable rule or regulation under the Act
and to attempt to effect a reconciliation pursuant to section 10.
(h) The Commission itself shall have authority to initiate suit against violators of the Act
pursuant to section 10.
(i) The Commission shall be given budgetary resources by Congress for the purpose of
extending grants to parties proposing research in genetic testing, whether such parties
be medical research institutes, employers, private foundations, or others.
The ultimate decision to approve a genetic test will fall upon NIOSH. The
Commission, however, will provide overall guidelines to aid NIOSH in determining
the hypersusceptibility limit for each test. The Commission should recommend that
NIOSH approve only those tests which are reasonably predictive of future illness
(have a high probative value). The illness or harm for which the screen or monitor
tests must be serious and pose a substantial health threat to a genetically grouped
classification of workers. To illustrate, although a genetic test has a high probative
value for detecting hypersusceptibility to dioxides which causes skin rashes in certain
employees, this test is certainly of less consequence and value than a test which
detects hypersusceptibility to cancer. 484
In deciding whether to approve a genetic test, NIOSH should commence its
determination with a review of the questions posed by Dr. Murray, a witness at the
OTA Hearing: 485
484. See Hearings (June 1982), supra note 17, at 99 (testimony of Prof. Rothstein, University of vest Virginia
College of Law).
485. The following questions and commentaries thereto were supplied by Dr. Murray at the Hearings (Oct. 1982),
supra note 17, at 79-80 and in his article, Murray, supra note 11.
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1. How many people have the anomaly?
The problem is twofold. If too many people have the anomaly, then validating
a test for such an anomaly would affect a great number of people; if too few suffer
from the anomaly, the use of the test is less cost effective.
2. What is the relative risk for people with the anomaly for that substance? What is the
absolute risk?
Dr. Murray states that "small increases in relative risk do not justify exclusion.
Even with large increases in relative risk, if the absolute risk remains low, exclusion
is hard to justify. "486
3. How many people will be misidentified by a screening program? How many false
negatives?
This question addresses issues of reliability of the test. It is critical that the
Commission submit guidelines to NIOSH which encourage approval of only those
tests with high probative value.
4. How many jobs are involved?
Obviously, the more jobs involved the greater the effect on job applicants and
employees in that industry.
5. What is the character of the illness or illnesses in question? How serious are they? Are
they irreversible? Are they detectable at a preclinical stage? Are they contestable, that is,
are their causes likely to be in dispute?
Regarding genetic screening, Dr. Murray comments that "it is easier to justify
paternalistic interventions to protect workers from diseases that are fatal, irreversible,
and undetectable in early stages even when they might prefer not to be protected."487
6. How solid is the evidence linking diseases to combinations of genetic conditions and
exposures to specific workplace substances at levels likely to be found in the contemporary
workplace?
Clearly a strong scientific basis should be established prior to adoption by the
Commission of a genetic test, whether for monitoring or screening purposes.
7. Does the screening program concentrate on groups with a history of discrimination?
8. How does genetic screening compare in its cost effectiveness to other programs that
would reduce work-related disease?
The Commission and NIOSH should focus on these issues in promulgating rules
and regulations for NIOSH to follow in determining the validity of tests. It is also
recommended that the Commission establish guidelines permitting NIOSH to desig-
nate tests as having a high probative value or low probative value based on scientific
criteria supporting factors of reliability. Only those tests with a high probative value
should be considered by NIOSH for approval under sections 5 and 6, and those with
486. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 79; Murray, supra note 11, at 8.
487. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 80; Murray, supra note 11, at 8.
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only a low probative value should be disapproved under section 7 or placed under
section 8 as requiring more investigation.
A fundamental concern regarding genetic tests is that genetic make-up is an
insurmountable trait inheritable along racial and ethnic lines. It therefore would be
absurd to apply a sickle cell trait test, for example, to an Anglo-American employee
or job applicant to satisfy Title VII concerns that tests be administered in a nondis-
criminatory fashion. Thus, the Commission has the responsibility of promulgating
guidelines and procedures to aid NIOSH in designating which tests will be applied to
which category of subjects pursuant to which risk of exposure. The subject-test-risk
match-up requires close attention to ensure that allegations of discrimination cannot
be justifiably raised. In particular, Dr. Murray emphasized that "[t]here must be a
sound scientific basis linking anomaly to exposure to disease.'"488
Although the Commission is responsible for overseeing the regulation of genetic
testing under the Act, it is appropriate to designate NIOSH as responsible for
determining the validity of the tests. Under OSHA, NIOSH has the authority to
conduct health hazard evaluations and is authorized to conduct studies and research
to develop safety and health standards. 489 Therefore, based on the guidelines set forth
by the Commission, NIOSH is to determine the validity of a given test and either
approve it, disapprove it, or identify it as pending.
The Commission would also be responsible for promulgating regulations con-
cerning the nature of the consent forms which employees need to sign and the
information which the employer must give to each employee tested, pursuant to
section 13. The Commission, not employers, will be responsible for identifying the
employees who are to be tested for toxins. This fact protects against the employee
concern that an employer may use the tests for a discriminatory purpose.
An incentive structure is needed to encourage groups to engage in genetic testing
research. A grant appears to be the most appropriate vehicle for addressing this issue.
The incentive on the part of an employer to engage in research is twofold: money is
available to encourage such practices; and the results will provide the employer with
a test to screen job applicants on the basis of their hypersusceptibility, thereby
curtailing expenses connected with occupational illnesses at a later time.
Section 5
Employer Proposal of Genetic Test
(a) Any employer or other interested party may propose a genetic test to the Commission
and the Commission shall decide whether to submit the proposed test and any
supporting documentation to NIOSH for approval.
(b) The Commission may allocate research grants for this purpose pursuant to regulations
promulgated to encourage research in genetic testing.
488. Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17 (emphasis in original).
489. See 20 U.S.C. § 3508(a) (1981). As of 1980, NIOSH was made a part ofthe Department of Health and Human
Services.
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Because one of the purposes of genetic testing is to encourage research, it is
critical to structure incentives for the employer to engage in research to prevent further
incidents of occupational disease. Employers could be encouraged to develop these
tests by an incentive structure which would be implemented through research grants
for the development of tests with high probative value.
Section 6
NIOSH Approved Tests
(a) If NIOSH approves a proposed genetic test, NIOSH shall submit a report to the
Commissioner detailing how the test should be used, who the test should be used to
screen, and what test result is necessary for an employee to be deemed hypersuscep-
tible both for genetic screening and genetic monitoring.
(b) Upon receiving a report of approval of a genetic test by NIOSH, the Commission shall
determine whether the report is sufficient or whether to send it back to NIOSH for
further details. Upon Commission approval of the NIOSH report, the Commission
shall publish the report in the Federal Register.
(c) Upon publication of an approved test in the Federal Register:
(1) An employer will be required to administer the test to employees pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the Commission for the purpose of genetic testing.
(2) In cases of genetic screening, an employee may be refused employment for being
diagnosed as hypersusceptible or for failure to submit to the test. No employee
shall be permitted to waive the results of the test when hypersusceptibility is
diagnosed. The employee, upon request, must be informed in writing of the results
of the test and be informed of his diagnosis of hypersusceptibility pursuant to
section 13.
(3) In cases of genetic monitoring, if any employee is found to be hypersusceptible,
the employer shall make every accommodation reasonably available to protect the
employee from the toxins in the workplace. The employer, however, has no duty
to go beyond any regulations promulgated by OSHA to deal with the particular
toxin in the workplace.
If there is no reasonable accommodation which will ensure that the employee
will return to an acceptable level of toxicity as determined by NIOSH, the employee
shall be given an option. The employee may maintain his present position once he has
received counselling regarding the execution of a waiver as to any claims arising out
of the aggravation of the particular hypersusceptibility diagnosed. If the employee
does not wish to sign such a waiver and no alternative means are available to
safeguard the employee, the employer must rotate the employee to another available
position in a nontoxic environment. If there is no such position available, then the
employer may lay off the employee with all pension and seniority rights preserved
until such time as a vacancy which the employee can fulfill becomes available.
The employer must inform the employee in writing of the results of the test and
of the diagnosis of hypersusceptibility. The employer also shall inform the employee
of the risk of harm which he faces if exposed to the toxins the genetic monitoring is
designed to detect. The employer has a further obligation to provide genetic coun-
selling for the hypersusceptible employee pursuant to regulations adopted by the
Commission.
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Although it may be a financial burden on certain small employers, genetic
monitoring should be mandatory. The important health implications to employees far
outweigh the cost to the employer. Analogous to the position expressed by the
Supreme Court concerning costs under OSHA for safeguarding employees, it is the
responsibility of the employer to bear additional costs associated with a healthful work
environment. 490 In contrast, an employer may decide whether to bear the additional
cost of genetic screening, which he might be well advised to do in order to avoid the
heavier costs associated with hypersusceptibility. Regulations promulgated by the
Commission will identify the frequency of the administration of such tests, the
procedure, and the bookkeeping surrounding this testing.
If a highly probative test identifies a prospective employee as being hypersus-
ceptible to toxins in the workplace, the employer should not be obligated to hire such
an employee. The employer, however, should be required to notify the job applicant
of the hypersusceptibility determination and should recommend that he seek coun-
selling. In addition, an employer owes a greater duty to his current employees and
must inform any employee of the unacceptable increase in the risk to his health as
determined by the genetic monitoring. The employer is obligated to provide genetic
counselling to the employee which would include the health implications of a
diagnosis of hypersusceptibility. In contrast to job applicants, the employer may not
discharge the employee because of his hypersusceptibility. This would be a harsh
reward for an employee who, because of his work for an employer, developed an
intolerance to a toxin with which he was required to work. Injustice can be prevented
by requiring the employer to accommodate the employee, to the extent technologi-
cally and economically feasible, 491 through means of protective equipment or by
removing the employee either temporarily or permanently from the toxic environment
and providing him with alternative employment. 492 This solution would partially allay
the fears expressed by labor that genetic testing would be used in a discriminatory
fashion. Although the employer is allowed to discriminate against job applicants, this
practice, based on genetic make-up, appears to be no worse than the discrimination
employers currently practice based on intelligence, manual dexterity, or other im-
mutable traits employers use to choose among job applicants.
Equity also is served by allowing the worker the choice of continuing in the toxic
environment once he has been made aware of the health hazards. This assumption of
the risk by the employee, 493 pursuant to the execution of a waiver, would relieve the
employer from future liability caused by exposure to the toxic substance provided that
the employer complies with any OSHA regulations regarding this toxin. Genetic
490. See American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 514 (1981).
491. The federal courts have used a similar requirement for OSHA standards which must be technologically and
economically feasible. See United States Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 913 (1981).
492. Similarly, OSHA has implemented several standards which require medical removal and rate retention of
employees. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text. But see American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that both MRP and RR could only be imposed on an employer after the
Secretary had made a finding that such provisions were necessary "to the achievement of a safe and healthful work
environment." Id. at 588.
493. Allowing the employee to assume the risk of exposure was also suggested in Note, supra note 12, at 1217.
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screening and monitoring should not be used by an employer to circumvent his
statutory duty to clean up the workplace under OSHA. Therefore, compliance with
OSHA by an employer should be emphasized.
Section 7
Genetic Tests Disapproved by NIOSH
(a) If NIOSH disapproves a genetic test it shall submit a report stating the reasons for
disapproval to the Commission.
(b) Upon reviewing a report of disapproval, the Commission shall publish a notice of
disapproval in the Federal Register stating that the test may not be used to make
employment decisions. This applies to both genetic screening and genetic monitor-
ing.
(c) Although an employer may use a disapproved test, no employee shall be required to
submit to a disapproved genetic test, nor shall any employee be refused employment
or discharged for refusing to submit to a disapproved genetic test or for being
diagnosed as hypersusceptible pursuant to a disapproved genetic test.
(d) An employer may not discriminate on the basis of a disapproved genetic test.
(e) An employee may submit a complaint to the Commission alleging discrimination on
the basis of a disapproved genetic test.
An employer should not base any employment decisions on the results of a
disapproved test, and it is a violation of the Act to do so. However, employers should
be encouraged to engage in research, and when the test might prove valid under
further research, it may be resubmitted to the Commission for approval.
Section 8
NIOSH Approval Pending or Further Study Needed
(a) If a genetic test has not been approved or disapproved by NIOSH, or it has been
submitted for approval and deemed pending based on further study, then the following
shall apply:
(1) In cases of genetic screening, the test may be used only as the last step prior to
employment and after the employee already has been deemed hired by the
employer.
(2) The employee may not be refused employment based on the test results, but must
be substantially accommodated by the employer to assure nonexposure to the toxin
to which the employee is deemed hypersusceptible.
(3) The employee may be denied employment for refusing to submit to the genetic
screening.
(4) The employee must be informed in writing of his possible hypersusceptibility and
be told that the test has not been approved by NIOSH but is pending approval.
(5) In cases of genetic monitoring, the employee must consent to the test in writing
and may not be subject to any employment action for refusing to take a genetic
monitoring test under this section.
(6) An employee consenting to a genetic monitoring test must be substantially
accommodated by the employer to assure nonexposure to the toxin to which the
employee is deemed hypersusceptible.
(7) An employee consenting to a genetic monitoring test and deemed hypersusceptible
must be informed in writing of the susceptibility the test is designed to detect and
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the harm to be avoided. The employer also must inform the employee in writing
of any health implications and notify him that the test has not been approved by
NIOSH but is pending approval.
This section is designed to encourage employers to experiment with genetic tests
while protecting the rights of employees from refusals to hire or other employment
decisions based on a pending genetic test. Once again, the employer is required to
substantially accommodate an employee based on the results of the test.
Section 9
Unlawful Employment Practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to use the results of genetic tests for purposes other than those identified under this
Act;
(2) to fail to comply with the provisions of this Act;
(3) to fail to comply with any rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act;
(4) to fail to administer a genetic monitoring test as required by the Commission.
Section 10
Investigations by the Commission; Private Right of Action
(a) The Commission may conduct its own investigations and issue complaints directly
against the employer for violation of any section.
(b) An aggrieved employee may submit a complaint to the Commission alleging a
violation of any provisions of this Act or any applicable rules or regulations.
(c) Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of an employee alleging that the em-
ployer has violated this Act, the Commission shall serve a notice of charge on such
employer within ten days of receipt of such charge. Charges shall be in writing and
shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.
Charges shall not be made public by the Commission. Upon receipt and review of a
complaint from an aggrieved employee, the Commission may order a regional direc-
tor to investigate the complaint, or the Commission itself may investigate the com-
plaint if it determines a substantial number of employees are involved in the alleged
illegal practice. If after investigation the Commission finds no reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify both
parties. If after investigation the Commission finds reasonable cause to believe that
the charge is true, the Commission or its regional director shall attempt to negotiate
a settlement or reconciliation of the complaint. If no settlement or reconciliation is
reached, the Commission may issue a right to sue letter to the employee who then
may commence suit in federal district court. Alternatively, the Commission may ini-
tiate suit if it finds a substantial number of employees are affected by the alleged
illegal practice. If the Commission declines to sue or to issue a right to sue letter,
then the employee may not sue the employer but may seek review of the Commis-
sion's decision in federal district court.
(d) A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employer act occurred, and notice of charge shall be served on the
party against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter.
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This section has been patterned after section 706 of Title VII.494 It is important
to give the employee a limited private right of action against the employer for
violations of the Act. In particular, the employee can avail himself of this right if the
employer violates the privacy and consent sections hereto or excludes or transfers an
employee without cause. This statute creates a private right of action for the employee
because of the possible employer abuse of the tests. The private right of action is
limited, however, by requiring that the employee first submit his complaint to the
Commission which could decline to issue a right to sue letter. This check on the right
of the claimant to redress his wrong in court is justified because it saves time. The
Commission is most familiar with the cases which will succeed and can screen out,
for the most part, those cases which are not meritorious. The employee does not have
a similar right under OSHA and must file in a state court under Title VII before
commencing an action in federal court. Therefore, the employee should have a limited
private right of action because his complaint will receive a fair and impartial initial
review by the Commission. He may, of course, always have this decision reviewed
by the federal district court.
Section 11
Civil Remedies
(a) Upon determination by the court that the employer has engaged in a violation of this
Act or the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder as charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the employer from such practices and may order the appropriate
affirmative action. The court's actions may include, but are not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees with or without back pay, or any other equitable relief
the court considers appropriate.
(b) The court may further order the recovery of attorneys' fees provided that the party
bringing the complaint, whether it be the employer or the Commission, proves a
willful, intentional, knowing violation of the Act or any applicable rule or regulation.
A rule or regulation that has been properly promulgated and published under this Act
shall constitute constructive, irrebuttal knowledge on the part of the employer.
The remedies provided hereunder are similar to those provided under Title
VII. 49 s However, Title VII does not specifically provide for payment of attorneys'
fees. OSHA, of course, provides no such private relief but only the right to impose
monetary penalties on the employer. 496 Simply exacting penalties from an employer
for violations of OSHA has not proven to be a very effective deterrent. In contrast,
the remedies provided by Title VII have proved to be much more effective. The key
to enforcement of the Act is effective deterrence measures, and the ones identified
herein will act to deter employer violations.
494. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976 & Supp. 1979). Section 706(a) states in relevant part: "No charge may be filed
under this subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law." Id. § 706(a).
495. Id. § 706(g).
496. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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Section 12
Confidentiality
(a) Individual results of genetic tests taken by an employer shall be kept confidential
subject to the following:
(1) The employer has the right to send anonymous results of the tests to NIOSH
without obtaining consent of the employee in connection with any rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder;
(2) The employer has the right to send anonymous results of the tests pursuant to any
requirements under OSHA or other similar statutes requiring such information;
(3) Written consent by the employee to release the results of the test(s) shall render
the results no longer confidential to the extent of the release; and
(4) In emergency situations in which grave risk to the health of the employee or his
immediate family exists if the results are kept confidential, the test results can be
disclosed.
(b) Results of genetic tests may be disclosed pursuant to the limited disclosures provided
in sections 5 and 13.
One of the fundamental concerns of labor spokespersons at the congressional
hearings was the issue of confidentiality of test results. 497 Concern was expressed that
employees would be identified by industries as hypersusceptible in general and
therefore unemployable. 498 Thus, limiting the ability of the employer to use the test
results and to disclose them to third parties is critical. As discussed earlier in the
Article, however, there are certain circumstances under which an employer has a
common law duty to disclose certain test results to family members. 499 Subsection
12(4) preserves that duty in emergency situations.
Section 13
Disclosure Requirements
(a) The employer is required to disclose in writing the results of any genetic test
performed on employees within ten days of the determination of the results. For
purposes of this section, the estate or guardian of a deceased or injured employee is
designated to receive the results in his stead.
(b) The employer may disclose the results of genetic tests to third parties provided the
employee or his duly appointed representative consents in writing.
(c) Results must be disclosed to the Commission upon request made pursuant to regula-
tions promulgated by the Commission. The Commission must keep any such results
confidential.
(d) The employer also may disclose results to the limited extent of defending himself
against any complaints brought by the Commission or an employee.
(e) The employer may use the results of the genetic tests for statistical, experimental, or
other studies to determine the usefulness or validity of a genetic test. However, the
employer may not use the results of tests for the purpose of discriminating against an
employee on the basis of his race, national origin, or religion, or for any purposes not
identified herein.
497. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
498. See Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 76 (testimony of Dr. Murray).
499. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
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This section satisfies the concern expressed by employees that they have a right
to know of test results and the risks to which they are being exposed. 500 This section
sets forth the limited circumstances under which an employer may disclose the results
of genetic tests. Section 13(e) is intended to encourage employer experimentation
with genetic tests for the purposes of employee health and welfare. Furthermore, this
section grants the employee an absolute right to know of the results of any such tests
so that he may make informed lifestyle decisions, such as whether to bear children or
seek employment in another field.
The Commission should, pursuant to its regulatory power, set forth the extent of
the employer's disclosure obligation. Also, the explanation of hypersusceptibility
should be given in terms which a lay person can understand.
Section 14
Employer Reporting Requirements
(a) The employer is required to maintain the results of any genetic tests for a period of
three years from the date of the test. The results shall contain the specific information
required by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
(b) Written genetic test results shall be made available upon written request by the
Commission, any of its regional directors, or any past or present employee.
(c) The Commission may promulgate rules and regulations requiring summaries or sta-
tistical results for either a specific genetic test or an overall genetic testing program.
The Commission, acting as a watch-dog over the employer, ensures that the
employer maintains proper records of any genetic tests used. Because the results of
genetic tests must be disclosed to employees, a provision for maintaining records
serves only as a back-up measure and therefore has limited applicability. Genetic
monitoring will be conducted on a regular basis, and the results will be disclosed on
a regular basis.
Section 15
Mandatory Counselling of Employees
(a) Pursuant to this Act, the employer must provide genetic counselling to an employee
found hypersusceptible. Such counselling shall be provided by an expert in the field
of genetic counselling and will be paid for by the employer.
Concern has been expressed that employees will feel inferior because of the
knowledge of their hypersusceptibility.501 Therefore, welfare of the employee neces-
sitates providing him with scientific answers to the concerns raised by his high-risk
status.
500. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
501. See Hearings (Oct. 1982), supra note 17, at 76 (testimony of Dr. Murray).
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Section 16
Informed Consent
(a) The employer or the Commission must obtain the informed consent of the employee
to conduct a genetic screening test or further research on genetic tests.
(b) The employer shall not be required to obtain permission of the employee to conduct
genetic monitoring of the employee.
(c) The informed consent shall be in writing and as prescribed by the Commission.
(d) No adverse employment actions may be taken by an employer against an employee
who refuses to engage in genetic testing for the employer's research purposes.
When the test is voluntary, the consent of the employee must be obtained.50 2 If
the employee refuses to consent to a genetic screening test, the employer may refuse
to hire him. A screening test has a dual purpose: monitor employee health and curtail
employer liability for workers' compensation and disability. Therefore, mandatory
tests of all employees is deemed appropriate.
Section 17
Effect of This Act on Other Statutes
(a) This Act preempts state law to the extent inconsistent.
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to allow any employer to avoid an applicable
OSHA regulation or standard.
(c) The Rehabilitation Act shall not apply to refusals to hire under section 6 of this Act,
provided section 6 has been complied with by the employer. No employer shall be
liable for a section 6 refusal to hire provided the employer complied with all applicable
rules or regulations.
(d) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act shall not apply to refusals to hire under section 6 of
this Act, provided section 6 has been complied with by the employer. No employer
shall be liable for a section 6 refusal to hire provided the employer complied with all
applicable rules or regulations.
In order to encourage the use of genetic testing in the workplace by employers,
it is essential to assure them that they will not be subject to conflicting sanctions of
other statutes such as Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. The employer must comply
with OSHA which focuses on worker safety.
VII. CONCLUSION
The above statutory provisions have attempted to address the various employer
and employee concerns with the practice of genetic testing in the workplace. Although
no perfect solutions to the issues exist, the statute has tried to balance employer and
employee concerns regarding such practices and to propose solutions to the problem
or regulation which will further the purposes of genetic testing: diagnosis, research,
information, and exclusion.
The importance of safeguarding the legitimate application of genetic testing far
outweighs the possibility for abuse. If in fact a means of determining susceptibility
502. See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
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of certain persons to toxins in the work environment is attainable, these means should
be legitimized by statute. Thus, the statute will permit employers to prescreen
applicants for their own safety before employment and to test employees during
employment to monitor their continued health. In the absence of legislation regulating
such practices, employers will continue to be reluctant to engage in genetic testing
because of the current legal uncertainty surrounding the practices.

